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ABSTRACT
The race salience effect of juror decision making states that White jurors will display bias
favoring White defendants over Black defendants only when race is not a prominent aspect of
the crime or trial. Although past research has established this effect under certain conditions, a
broader investigation of the effect is currently lacking in the literature. Furthermore, the literature
has largely ignored the role that jury deliberation may have in attenuating or exacerbating the
race salience effect. In total, 357 White mock jurors participated in a simulated court case about
an interracial bar fight in which race was made salient either through attorney statements
(Experiment 1, N = 207) or through pretrial publicity (Experiment 2, N = 150); participants in
Experiment 1 also convened as a jury and deliberated the case. In both experiments, a race
salience effect was found for verdict preference, but not for any other trial outcome. In addition,
the effect identified was in the opposite direction to that expected based on previous research, as
results showed an outgroup favoritism effect in race salient conditions. Experiment 1 also found
no race salience effects following jury deliberation, indicating that no new effects were created
through deliberation and any that existed prior to deliberation were eliminated. Implications of
these findings for the race salience literature and the juror decision making literature are
discussed along with implications for actual court cases.

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In October, 2014, Laquan McDonald, a 17-year-old Black man, was fatally shot by Jason
Van Dyke, a White officer of the Chicago Police Department (Gorner & Meisner, 2015). The
shooting was initially treated as a case of justifiable homicide, with Van Dyke contending that
McDonald was lunging at officers with a knife. Pressure from the media, and a court decision,
eventually led to the release of dashcam videotape evidence depicting the incident (Queally &
Winton, 2015). This videotape revealed that McDonald never attempted to stab an officer; in
fact, McDonald was shot from behind, meaning that he was walking away from the officers.
After the dashcam videotape’s release, Van Dyke was charged with first-degree murder. Even
though the crime is interracial in nature, prosecutors have thus far not labeled the incident as
racially motivated. Regardless, many news outlets have highlighted the racial aspects of the case
(CBS, 2015; Madhani, 2015; Schmadeke, 2015; Williams, 2015). For example, the Chicago
Tribune included a quote from McDonald’s uncle in which he comments on the “…culture in the
county of Cook… where police feel comfortable with murdering African-American people”
(Schmadeke, 2015, para. 14).
Racial motivation was similarly implanted into O. J. Simpson’s 1995 murder trial, this
time by Simpson’s defense attorneys. The prosecutors in the case presented significant
circumstantial evidence linking Simpson to the murder, including blood-soaked socks and
gloves, suggestive DNA analysis, a vehicle seen at the scene of the crime, shoe prints, and
1

several eyewitnesses (Ayres, 1994). In response, the defense centered their case around the
suggestion that the Los Angeles Police Department, particularly a White officer named Mark
Fuhrman, had planted and fabricated evidence in order to frame Simpson for the murder, and that
they had done so because of racial bias against Simpson (Toobin, 1994). Evidence in support of
potential racial bias was presented throughout the trial, and this racial bias was considered so
important to the defense’s case that Johnnie Cochran, one of Simpson’s attorneys, highlighted
the role of racism throughout his closing arguments: “…This man [Fuhrman] had the power to
carry out his racist views and that is what is so troubling… This man is an indiscriminate
racist… this man over the time of these interviews uses the ‘N’ word 42 times” (Walraven, 1995;
par. 26-28).
Statements such as those made in the Chicago Tribune and by Johnnie Cochran have an
undeniable impact on the reader and can even impact the trial itself in isolated cases (Nolan,
2014), but can tying the concept of race to a case systematically and predictably influence how
defendants are evaluated by jurors and juries? In the psychological literature, the race salience
effect of juror decision making states that, when the racial nature of a crime is highlighted, White
jurors reach verdicts that are equal across Black and White defendants. However, when race is
not made salient to the case, White jurors reach more lenient verdicts for White defendants
compared to Black defendants, even when they have committed the same crime and the same
evidence has been presented (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). Thus, by highlighting the racial
aspect of his client’s case in closing arguments, Cochran may not only have poked holes in the
prosecutor’s case but also allowed Simpson to receive an equivalent evaluation by the jury to
that they would have afforded a White defendant. Similarly, by focusing on the racial nature of
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the Van Dyke case, pretrial publicity such as that provided by the Tribune may be inadvertently
ensuring that he does not receive any racially biased treatment by the jury.
However, the current state of the race salience literature does not allow researchers, or
those in the legal realm, to conclude that either Cochran’s or the Tribune’s statements have any
predictable impacts on the case because the race salience literature is limited in two critical ways.
First, almost all research on the race salience effect has investigated its impact when presented
directly in trial evidence (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). However, past research suggests that
other aspects of a trial may have different temporal (Pennington & Hastie, 1986) and cognitive
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972) considerations than those related to trial evidence presentation.
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that there is any effect on final trial decisions when race is made
salient outside of trial evidence. Second, very little prior research has considered how race
salience affects jury-level decisions; instead, almost all research has investigated the race
salience effect at the individual juror level (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). Because of the unique
qualities of group-level decision making (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001) and
the role of jury deliberation in actual criminal trials (Ellsworth, 1989), it is premature to conclude
that a jury-level race salience effect, if present at all, is identical to the juror-level effect.
Therefore, the purpose of the current studies was to investigate the generalizability of the race
salience effect using two alternative manipulations: pretrial publicity and attorney arguments
(both opening and closing statements). In addition, the current studies investigated the impact of
making race salient at both the individual juror level and the jury level in order to determine
whether the race salience effect continues to impact verdict decisions following jury
deliberations.

3

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
White Juror Bias and the Race Salience Effect
Researchers and legal professionals alike have considered the role of race in the
courtroom, and both have generally concluded that White jurors are more lenient toward White
defendants (Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler, & Moore, 2002), more punitive toward Black
defendants (Klein & Creech, 1982), or both (Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005; Sweeney
& Haney, 1992). For example, a meta-analysis by Sweeney and Haney (1992) concluded that
juror racial bias led to harsher sentences for Black defendants compared to White defendants,
and that this effect was consistent across both geographic regions and crime type. From a legal
perspective, the United States Supreme Court has made rulings suggesting that the racial makeup
of a jury may affect its decision making process (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986; Strauder v. West
Virginia, 1880).
Although the majority of the evidence suggests that White juror bias results in negative
outcomes for Black defendants, some research suggests that this may not always be true. For
instance, Mazzella and Feingold (1994) conducted a meta-analysis on the effects of various
demographic characteristics on juror decision making; the investigators concluded that a
defendant’s race did not influence juror judgments. Even more strikingly, in a study conducted
by Poulson (1990), White jurors were more likely, not less, to find White defendants guilty
compared to Black defendants. Subsequent research has found similar null (Williams &
4

Holcomb, 2001) or leniency effects on White juror decision making (Braun & Gollwitzer, 2012).
Other research suggests that White juror bias only leads to negative outcomes in certain
instances, such as when inadmissible evidence is present (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner,
2005) or when jury instructions are absent (Mitchell et al., 2005).
To explain how and when White jurors may display racial bias, researchers have focused
on identifying aspects of court cases that may permit jurors to subtly display their biases. For
example, Braun and Gollwitzer (2012) found that jurors were more lenient toward outgroup
defendants compared to ingroup defendants, but that the disparity disappeared when jurors were
given an opportunity to establish that they held no prejudice toward the outgroup prior to making
their decision. The authors interpreted this finding as showing that jurors may sometimes use the
decision making process as proof that they do not hold prejudice toward the outgroup. Similarly,
Hodson et al. (2005) found that White jurors sentenced White and Black defendants equally, but
that when a particularly damaging piece of DNA evidence was deemed inadmissible in court,
White jurors gave Black defendants longer sentences than White defendants. Here, the authors
concluded that the inadmissible evidence provided White jurors an implicit justification to subtly
display their biases: without a comparison based on defendant race, an outsider would likely
consider the juror’s decision to be based on the DNA evidence, not racial bias.
Rather than identifying particular situations in which White jurors may display racial
bias, Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) proposed a general explanation as to when and how White
jurors display bias. They termed this explanation the race salience effect (Sommers & Ellsworth,
2000). More specifically, the race salience effect states that White juror bias will only be
displayed when race is not a central focus of the case because jurors have no reason to believe
that their decisions will be interpreted as racially motivated. To explain why White jurors display
5

racial bias only when race is not salient in a case, Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) used the
aversive racism theory framework (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Therefore, before continuing
with a discussion of the race salience effect, I will discuss aversive racism as it relates to displays
of racial attitudes and to courtroom decision making.
Aversive Racism
Historically, blatant racism against Black Americans has been prevalent in the United
States, both in society (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) and the legal system (Korematsu v.
United States, 1944; Mitchell, 2005; Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000).
However, these blatant forms of racism have consistently declined over the past half century. On
an individual level, White Americans’ blatantly racist attitudes toward Black Americans have
decreased (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991), and White Americans are less likely in contemporary
America to support obvious examples of discrimination, such as support for segregation laws
(McConahay et al., 1981) or bias in employment selection decisions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000).
The legal system has also taken steps to eliminate blatant racial bias in both society (Brown v.
Board of Education, 1954) and in the courtroom (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986). Thus, blatantly
racist actions and statements are a rare occurrence in today’s society (Gaertner & Dovidio,
2005).
However, racial prejudice consists of more than an individual’s conscious and overt
racial attitudes (Devine, 1989). Specifically, racial prejudices consist of two distinct components:
explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes. Explicit racial attitudes are beliefs that the individual
consciously holds toward racial outgroups; these attitudes are often referred to as “old-fashioned
racism” (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; McConahay et al., 1981; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000)
because they reflect more traditional and direct forms of racial bias, such as believing that Black
6

Americans are less intelligent and more dishonest in comparison to White Americans (Dovidio
& Gaertner, 1991). Explicit prejudice also encompasses more subtle constructs such as modern
racism (McConahay, 1986), in which the prejudiced individual expresses their attitudes
indirectly through opposition to institutions and policies supporting the racial outgroup.
In contrast, implicit racial attitudes are those of which the individual is not consciously
aware and which have been shaped by processes of the individual’s development (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2005). Throughout life, individuals engage in social categorization, based on salient
groups that the individual belongs to, such as a person’s race (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). By
placing people into different racial categories, the individual naturally forms a racial ingroup (a
group of people that share the individual’s perceived racial status) and racial outgroups (groups
of people that do not share the individual’s perceived race; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Once
these groups have been developed, people tend to show bias in favor of their own racial group
and against other racial groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Critically, this natural ingroup
favoritism and outgroup prejudice occurs implicitly, meaning it occurs automatically and outside
of the individual’s awareness (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).
Although several techniques have been developed to measure implicit attitudes (see
Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; and De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors,
2009), the most common method by which implicit racial attitudes are frequently tested is the
Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a
computer-based test in which individuals must place targets into categories using two keyboard
keys. For the racial IAT, individuals first categorize targets (typically either human faces or
names; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) as belonging to one of two social groups, such as
White or Black. Then, individuals categorize a list of words as being either positive or negative
7

in valence. Finally, individuals do both tasks simultaneously while still only using two keys,
such that one of each initial category is paired (e.g., a single key would categorize a face as
White and a word as positive). Implicit bias is measured through reaction times during this final
task (Greenwald et al., 1998). For example, shorter reaction times when White faces are paired
with positive words would indicate an implicit preference for White individuals. Research using
the IAT has found consistent support for a natural ingroup favoritism, as implicit racial bias is
prevalent in both White and Black Americans even in individuals who consciously believe
themselves to be nonracist (Nosek et al., 2007; for instances of implicit outgroup favoritism, see
Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).
Importantly, an individual’s explicit and implicit racial attitudes do not always agree
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Past research examining the connection between explicit and
implicit racial attitudes has found a weak relationship between the two (Greenwald et al., 1998;
Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). In other words, an individual may explicitly
hold neutral or positive feelings toward a racial outgroup while simultaneously harboring
implicit, automatic biases against that group. Research indicates that the two forms of racial bias
can have simultaneous and contrasting influences on an individual’s behavior. For example,
Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner (2002) found that Whites’ explicit racial attitudes predicted
how much verbal bias they exhibited toward a Black target but that their implicit racial attitudes
predicted how friendly the White individual was perceived to be by a Black target.
To explain the disagreement between many White Americans’ explicit and implicit racial
attitudes, Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) proposed that the traditional racist, who consciously and
explicitly holds negative attitudes toward Black Americans, has largely been supplanted by the
aversive racist, whose racial bias occurs implicitly and often in contrast to the individual’s
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explicitly held racial beliefs. As opposed to the traditional racist, aversive racists typically hold
honest, positive explicit attitudes toward racial outgroups and may even actively support racial
equality measures (Gaertner, 1973). However, as an outcome of natural social categorization
processes, aversive racists also hold negative implicit attitudes toward racial outgroups which
can be triggered automatically and unconsciously. Because these implicit attitudes exist outside
of the individual’s conscious awareness (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), aversive
racists believe themselves to be truly egalitarian in their beliefs and actions toward racial
outgroups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).
Because the aversive racist’s explicit and implicit racial attitudes are at odds with one
another, the decision making process of an aversive racist is more complex than the traditional
racist (Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, & Zanna, 2008; Nail, Harton, & Decker, 2003). Thus,
aversive racists use the context of the situation to determine whether or not to display racial
biases (Aberson & Ettlin, 2004). When the individual’s potential actions are clearly defined as
either racist or nonracist, the aversive racist will not display bias because the situation has
triggered the individual’s explicit attitudes. However, when the individual’s potential actions are
unclear in their motivations and meaning, or when the individual can provide an alternative
explanation for their actions, the aversive racist will display racial bias because the situation has
bypassed their explicit attitudes and has triggered their negative implicit attitudes.
For example, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) conducted a study in which participants were
asked to evaluate the suitability of a job applicant for a particular position. In the experiment,
participants were given a description of the candidate’s qualifications (very strong, very weak, or
ambiguous) as well as indications about the candidate’s race. The authors found that, when the
candidate’s qualifications were either very strong or very weak, White participants evaluated the
9

candidate equally across race. However, when the candidate’s qualifications were ambiguous,
White participants exhibited ingroup bias, evaluating the White candidate as more fit for the job
than the Black candidate. These results reflect aversive racism theory in action. When
participants were given clear indications of the correct decision, they understood that any bias in
favor of the White candidate would suggest racism; therefore, they evaluated the candidates
equally. However, when participants were placed into an ambiguous situation, they were
provided with an alternative explanation for their attitudes (the candidate’s qualifications) and
therefore were able to unconsciously display bias favoring the White candidate. Other studies
have yielded similar findings in relation to helping behaviors (Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005),
college admissions (Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002), and legal decision making (Dovidio,
Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997; Johnson, Whitestone, Jackson, & Gatto, 1995).
When viewed through the aversive racism lens, the complicated role of race in the
courtroom becomes clearer. When investigating White juror bias, researchers frequently
highlight the racial aspects of the case, resulting in aversive racists not displaying racial bias
because the role of race is explicit (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). On the other hand, aversive
racism theory predicts that when White jurors are placed in situations where the role of race is
ambiguous, they will display bias because the defendant’s race is activating their negative
implicit bias. Generally, the literature supports these predictions. For example, Skolnick and
Shaw (1997) found no racial effects in their investigation of White juror bias. However, the
design of the study was heavily based on the O. J. Simpson trial, and the experiment was
conducted in Los Angeles while Simpson’s trial was ongoing – a situation in which race would
be particularly salient in jurors’ minds. Similarly, Fein, Morgan, Norton, and Sommers (1997)
found that pretrial publicity highlighting the potential for racial bias in the case was effective in
10

reducing guilt ratings toward Black defendants. In both of these examples, the relevance of race
to the case was clear, meaning that aversive racists should not display bias in this situation for
fear of appearing explicitly racist. Klein and Creech (1982) found that, in identical cases with
identical evidence, Black defendants were considered guiltier than White defendants of an
accused rape. Similarly, DeSantis and Kayson (1997) found that in a burglary case, White
defendants were given shorter sentences than Black defendants for the same crime; here, too, the
defendant’s race was not important to the case. In neither of these cases was the defendant’s race
highlighted, so jurors would have no reason to suspect their responses might be interpreted as
racially biased. Thus, aversive racists would be able to display their implicit racial bias because
their decisions could be attributed to other factors.
The Race Salience Effect
Using the aversive racism framework, Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) proposed that the
distinction between explicit and implicit racism, and the tendency of individuals to only act racist
when their explicit attitudes have been bypassed, can clarify the contradictory findings of the
White juror bias literature. Specifically, they proposed the race salience effect, which states that,
when a defendant’s race is not a salient factor in a case, White jurors are more likely to be
influenced by their implicit ingroup bias toward White defendants and against Black defendants
because they are not actively thinking about race. This ingroup bias, in turn, leads White jurors
to find Black defendants guiltier and more liable for the crime and to sentence Black defendants
more harshly than White defendants. However, when the defendant’s race is explicitly
mentioned as a salient aspect of a case, jurors become primed to consider any racial biases they
may have toward the defendant. By thinking about the possibility of acting unfairly, White
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jurors’ explicit knowledge of their biases are activated, allowing them to control their implicit
biases and equalizing outcomes for White and Black defendants.
Sommers and Ellsworth (2000, Study 1) originally examined the race salience effect
while investigating the roles of defendant and juror race in courtroom decision making using a
methodology common to that literature: racially-charged court cases. In their study, both White
and Black participants took the role of a mock juror in trials involving interracial crimes (e.g., an
interracial assault between basketball teammates) in which the race of the defendant was
manipulated (Black vs. White). In each case, the role of the defendant’s race to the case was
made explicit to the juror (e.g., the assaulter in the basketball case alleged that racial language
had been used beforehand). The authors found that only Black mock jurors showed racial bias,
rating Black defendants as less guilty than White defendants and judged cases against White
defendants to be stronger than cases against Black defendants. In contrast, White mock jurors
showed no bias in guilt or sentencing ratings and found the cases against defendants to be
equally strong across defendant race.
Rather than interpreting these initial findings as evidence that only Black jurors show
racial bias in racially charged trials, Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) considered the role of
aversive racism in shaping White jurors’ responses. Because race was explicit and important in
these cases, the authors suggested that White mock jurors were forced to think about their own
racial biases and judge the defendant in a way that could not be construed as racially biased. In
other words, the explicit role of the defendant’s race to the case triggered the explicit egalitarian
racial attitudes mock jurors held, causing these individuals to respond in an unprejudiced
manner. Thus, the authors proposed that White jurors would show racial bias when the
defendant’s race was not an explicit (or salient) aspect of the case because, in this situation,
12

jurors’ explicit attitudes would not be triggered, allowing the jurors’ implicit racial biases to
influence their decision making.
To test this prediction, Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) conducted a second study in which
they manipulated the salience of the defendant’s race to the case. As with Study 1, both White
and Black participants took the role of a mock juror in a cross-race criminal case; in Study 2, the
case involved the assault and battery of either a Black woman by her White boyfriend or of a
White woman by her Black boyfriend. In the race salient conditions, participants were told that
the defendant had slapped his girlfriend because she “…[knew] better than to talk that way about
a [White/Black] man in front of his friends” (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000, p. 1373). In the nonrace salient conditions, participants were given the same information without referring to the
defendant’s race. Results supported the aversive racism framework and indicated the presence of
a race salience effect. When the defendant’s race was salient, no bias was shown against the
Black defendant in comparison to the White defendant. However, when race was not salient,
White participants were more likely to find the Black defendant guilty and were more punitive to
the Black defendant compared to the White defendant. In addition, White jurors considered
Black defendants in the non-race-salient condition to be significantly more aggressive and
violent than the White defendant.
Subsequent research on the race salience effect (and aversive racism in the courtroom)
has highlighted its pervasive nature and practical implications. For example, the race salience
effect has been replicated using several different crime scenarios (sexual assault: Sommers,
2006; homicide: Cohn, Bucolo, Pride, & Sommers, 2009). Furthermore, along with affecting
judgments of the defendant, race salience effects have been demonstrated through perceptions of
attorneys (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001) and jury deliberation content (Sommers, 2006).
13

Subsequent literature has also revealed several cognitive and motivational factors related to the
race salience effect, including old-fashioned and modern racism (Cohn et al., 2009), social
dominance orientation (Kemmelmeier, 2005), and working memory capacity (Kleider, Knuycky,
& Cavrak, 2012). Researchers have also recently begun applying the race salience effect to real
life cases (Lee, 2013) and extending the effect beyond the legal realm (Cox & Devine, 2014).
Limitations of the Race Salience Effect
Past research on the race salience effect indicates that it can impact juror-level decisions
in the courtroom (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), that the effect persists for both low- and highprejudiced jurors (Cohn et al., 2009), and that aversive racism in the courtroom is linked to
cognitive and motivational factors (Kemmelmeier, 2005; Kleider et al., 2012). However, there
are still a number of factors concerning the race salience effect that have yet to be investigated.
Nine years after their original study, Sommers and Ellsworth (2009) highlighted numerous
looming misconceptions and unanswered questions regarding the race salience effect. The first
of these misconceptions concerns what the race salience effect actually is. This issue stems from
the fact that the term “race salience” has several meanings in the psychological literature (see,
e.g., Gay & Tate, 1998; Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010; and Shih, Bonam, Sanchez, &
Peck, 2007); however, the race salience effect refers to an explicit reference to the defendant’s
race and the relevancy of the defendant’s race to the case (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). Other
important considerations raised by Sommers and Ellsworth (2009) included misunderstandings
about the probabilistic nature of the race salience effect and the lack of research using actual
jurors and juries.
Perhaps the most important unanswered question is whether the race salience effect can
be induced through any mention of the relevance of the defendant’s race to the case, or whether
14

the race salience effect only occurs when race is made salient at particular points or through
particular methodologies during a trial. In their original investigation of the race salience effect,
Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) manipulated race salience using a statement presented as
evidence during the trial. They suggested that future research should expand their findings by
investigating alternative manipulations of race salience, through means such as pretrial publicity,
voir dire questioning, and attorney arguments (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). However, in their
review of the literature, Sommers and Ellsworth (2009) state that, “…although researchers
continue to write in general terms about ‘race salience,’ in almost every published investigation
this variable has been operationalized the same way” (p. 607). The majority of subsequent
research on the race salience effect has indeed used similar manipulations to that of the original
race salience effect study. For example, Sommers and Ellsworth’s (2001) follow-up examination
of the effect manipulated race salience in a nearly identical manner to their original
manipulation, changing only the wording of the manipulation to match the trial of interest. Other
studies of race salience have used recorded video as their stimuli to enhance the ecological
validity of their trial simulation (Bornstein, 1999); however, these video manipulations have
typically manipulated race salience using trial evidence as the original study did (Cohn et al.,
2009; Thomas & Balmer, 2007).
There have been two investigations of the race salience effect that incorporated
alternative manipulations. Sommers (2006) manipulated race salience during the voir dire phase
of the trial. Results indicated that mock jurors exposed to the race salience voir dire questions
were less likely to believe the defendant was guilty prior to jury deliberation, suggesting that voir
dire questions are an effective way of making race salient. In a second investigation, Bucolo and
Cohn (2010) manipulated race salience through opening and closing statements made by the
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defense attorney in a trial involving a bar altercation. Results indicated that making race salient
led to a leniency effect for Black defendants compared to White defendants, such that White
mock jurors found Black defendants less guilty than White defendants. Although these two
studies represent important steps toward establishing a broad race salience effect, neither study
has been replicated.
The dearth of research on alternative manipulations, and the lack of replication for the
few studies that have used alternative manipulations, is a critical limitation of the race salience
literature because there are a number of steps during a trial in which White juror bias could be
reduced by making race salient. Pretrial publicity, attorney statements, voir dire questioning, the
racial makeup of a jury, and jury deliberation are all common aspects of a trial in which a juror’s
racial biases could be manipulated by the presence (or absence) of pertinent information
(Sommers, 2006; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001; 2009). Other, less common components of
a trial, such as inadmissible evidence, judicial instructions regarding the defendant’s race, and
the labeling of the crime as a hate crime may also have the capacity to engender a race salience
effect (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). However, just because trial aspects may be able to make
race salient does not mean that they are equally effective, and it is erroneous to assume an effect
exists in these cases in the absence of empirical evidence (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009).
Therefore, the first objective of the proposed studies is to broaden the literature on the
race salience effect by investigating alternative race salience manipulations. Across two
experiments, I will investigate two different methodologies of manipulating race salience:
through attorney statements and through pretrial publicity. Of these, attorney statements have
been tentatively discussed in the literature (Bucolo & Cohn, 2010). However, issues with the
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study’s methodology (addressed in the following section) and its lack of replication provide
ample rationale for a second investigation of this method.
Attorney Statements
One method by which race may effectively be made salient is through opening and
closing statements of a trial. Opening statements and closing arguments are designated sections
during a trial in which lawyers may provide structure or coherence to evidence that will be
presented (in opening statements) or evidence that has already been presented (in closing
arguments; Hobbs, 2003). While attorneys are barred from presenting any new evidence in their
statements (Hobbs, 2003), they may influence jurors by suggesting a narrative for the case or
shifting the focus of the evidence (Spiecker & Worthington, 2003); indeed, attorneys believe
these statements play a crucial role in the eventual outcome of a trial (Diamond, Casper, Heiert,
& Marshall, 1996).
Past research has consistently shown that opening statements and closing arguments can
have a strong influence on juror decision making (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Mack, &
Wrightsman, 1981; Pyszczynski & Wrightsman, 1981). For example, Weld and Danzig (1940)
investigated how mock juror verdicts shifted through 18 distinct phases of a trial. The authors
found that nearly half of all mock jurors believed the defendant to be at least partially liable after
the prosecutor’s opening statement. Further, after hearing the defense opening statement, many
mock jurors believed the defendant to not be liable. In addition, the authors found the defense
closing arguments to be the most effective phase of the trial in persuading mock jurors. A more
recent study by Diamond et al. (1996) found that 70% of all jurors in a death penalty sentencing
hearing did not change their verdict preferences following the presentation of opening
statements. Similar effects have been found for closing statements (Spiecker & Worthington,
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2003), and research indicates that attorney arguments can also influence juror beliefs regarding
the trial outside of final verdicts (opening statements: Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; closing
arguments: Haney & Lynch, 1997; Stallard & Worthington, 1998).
Consistent with this research, Bucolo and Cohn (2010) achieved a race salience effect
through defense attorney statements. In their experiment, White participants were put into the
role of mock jurors in a trial involving an interracial assault (carried out by either a White or a
Black defendant). All participants were presented with the same evidence, including victim
statements and direct and cross-examination of prosecution and defense witnesses. In addition to
these, mock jurors also heard opening statements and closing arguments from both attorneys.
Within the defense attorney’s statements, race salience was manipulated. Mock jurors in the race
salient condition were given defense attorney statements that included several passages
suggesting that race was relevant to the case (e.g., “The defendant did what any [Black/White]
man in this situation would do;” Bucolo & Cohn, 2010, p. 297). Mock jurors in the race nonsalient condition were given the same attorney statements without the race-relevant passages.
Finally, mock jurors rated how guilty they believed the defendant to be. Consistent with past
research (Cohn et al., 2009; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), Bucolo and Cohn (2010) found that
making race salient impacted mock juror guilt ratings. In contrast to the equalizing effects found
in the literature (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009), the authors found a leniency effect: when race
was not salient, mock jurors gave equivalent guilt ratings for White and Black defendants, but
when race was salient, mock jurors gave Black defendants significantly lower guilt ratings
compared to White defendants. Thus, Bucolo and Cohn’s (2010) findings indicate that attorney
statements may be capable of creating unique race salience effects, leading mock jurors to be
more lenient when the defendant is Black and race is salient to the case.
18

However, there are two important limitations of Bucolo and Cohn’s (2010) investigation.
First, the authors provide no theoretical framework or justification to explain how or why
attorney statements would be capable of creating a race salience effect. In fact, little discussion
of the literature on opening statements or closing arguments is provided in the article at all. This
discussion is important because it relates to the second limitation: the authors did not examine
the independent effects of opening statements and closing arguments. Because the authors
simultaneously manipulated race salience within both attorney statements, it is impossible to
conclude whether the effect was achieved because of the opening statement, the closing
argument, or a combination of both.
The delineation between opening statements and closing arguments is critical in
understanding how and when race saliency will have an impact because research into other
constructs indicates that the two attorney statements have different effects, serve different
purposes, and involve different persuasion techniques. For example, Diamond et al. (1996) found
that, after opening statements, 70% of their mock jurors never changed their beliefs regarding the
defendant’s guilt, and 93% of their participants had reached a decision prior to closing
arguments, suggesting that a race salience manipulation first presented during closing arguments
may arrive too late to influence jurors. In addition, Spiecker and Worthington (2003) examined
the effectiveness of different arguments presented by attorneys during opening statements and
closing arguments. The authors investigated narrative arguments (in which the attorney provides
jurors with a story structure that they can fit the evidence to) and legal-expository arguments (in
which the attorney focuses on the legal requirements necessary to find the defendant guilty).
They concluded that narrative arguments are most effective when presented during opening
statements and legal-expository arguments are most effective when presented during closing
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arguments. In other words, providing jurors with a narrative schema to understand the evidence
was relatively ineffective when presented during closing arguments. Because making race salient
similarly provides jurors with an interpretation of the evidence, Spiecker and Worthington’s
(2003) findings suggest that race salience effects may be most prominent during opening
statements.
The literature on cognitive schemas and related constructs in decision making situations
also suggests that opening statements may be better suited to make race salient than closing
arguments. Research indicates that memory recall and comprehension are enhanced when
individuals can access a relevant cognitive schema (a knowledge structure which guides and
shapes information processing; Anderson & Pearson, 1984). For example, Bransford and
Johnson (1972) found that when participants were not given a context in which to understand an
ambiguous passage, comprehension of the passage was poorer than when they were given the
context of the passage. Research on related constructs in the courtroom suggests a similar
pattern. For instance, a study by Lord et al. (1979) found that pro- and anti-death penalty
participants interpreted and evaluated the same death penalty arguments differently based upon
their preconceived stance on the issue. Furthermore, Smith (1991) has shown that mock jurors
use prior schemas about the law when making judgments in a criminal case, even when they are
instructed not to do so (Smith, 1993).
Applied to juror decision making and the race salience effect, opening statements may be
capable of providing a prior knowledge base to jurors by which they will better process racerelevant trial evidence. Introducing the schema that race is relevant to the case before the
presentation of any evidence has the potential to allow attorneys to shape jurors’ thematic
frameworks to be centered on the defendant’s race. By doing so, jurors may be more likely to
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interpret the trial in a race-relevant manner, and their recall and comprehension of the trial may
therefore be centered on the defendant’s race. In contrast, a race salient schema first presented
during closing arguments may not create a prior knowledge base to interpret the trial because all
the evidence has already been presented. Thus, if the race salience effect acts as a schema for
jurors when presented during attorney arguments, opening statements may be more effective in
creating that schema than closing arguments.
Pennington and Hastie’s (1986) story model of juror decision making also provides a
theoretical lens supporting opening statements as more effective than closing arguments in
making race salient. The story model states that, in order to organize, comprehend, and interpret
evidence presented at trial, jurors construct stories of the crime that link evidence together in a
causal manner. Within these stories, jurors also include any preconceived biases or knowledge
outside of the court proceedings (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). As jurors consider the evidence,
they may consider multiple stories; indeed, the defense and prosecution may proffer competing
stories to the jury through attorney statements (Spiecker & Worthington, 2003). Jurors choose
between competing stories by considering their coherency as well as the ability of each story to
uniquely cover the evidence (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Jurors then use this story to decide
which subset of evidence is particularly important and which is not. Finally, based on the
constructed story and the evidence congruent with it, jurors make a verdict decision by fitting
their story to the verdict which best meets their interpretation of the evidence (Pennington &
Hastie, 1986).
Research has consistently shown that jurors construct narratives in order to understand
trial evidence and that they use these narratives to make decisions. Pennington and Hastie (1986)
found that mock jurors’ mental structuring of the evidence resembled a story, and that jurors who
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reached different verdicts had constructed different stories of the evidence. In addition,
Pennington and Hastie (1988) found that, after hearing trial evidence, mock jurors had better
memory recall for sentences related to their constructed story than for sentences irrelevant to
their story. In addition, an investigation of juror decision making in actual court cases concluded
that the story model best fit how jurors reported their decision making processes (Hannaford,
Hans, Mott, & Munsterman, 1999). Similar experimental research has extended the story model
to investigate the influence of expert testimony (Klettke, Graesser, & Powell, 2010) and
emotional expressions (Voss & Van Dyke, 2001) on trial outcomes, and other researchers have
found that jurors’ memory recall of trial information shifts to fit their constructed story (Holyoak
& Simon, 1999). Thus, there is ample evidence that jurors construct stories, fit the evidence to
these stories, and then use these stories to make final decisions in trials.
As with the other evidence presented, the story model of juror decision making suggests
that first making race salient during opening statements would be more effective than doing so
during closing arguments, and that first making race salient during closing arguments may be
ineffective. In order to construct a coherent story of the trial that covers the evidence, jurors
should be made aware of a given story’s relevance during the early stages of the trial
(Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Opening statements provide attorneys with an early stage in which
they can introduce a story, and indeed many attorneys use opening statements to do so (Spiecker
& Worthington, 2003). Thus, giving jurors information regarding the role of race in the case
during opening statements (prior to the presentation of evidence) could lead jurors to construct
stories framed around the defendant’s race, causing jurors to be aware of their own explicit racial
biases and thus leading to a race salience effect. On the other hand, jurors may have already
reached a story conclusion in which race was not relevant if race is made salient only during
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closing arguments. In this case, jurors may see the invocation of defendant race as an ineffective
attorney ploy (Bucolo & Cohn, 2010) or may simply disregard the argument as not fitting their
story of the crime. In addition, if race is made salient in opening statements, making race salient
again during closing arguments may have no additive effects. Spiecker and Worthington (2003)
found that the most effective organizational strategy for attorney arguments was to construct
opening statements using a story structure and to construct closing arguments using a legalexpository structure, suggesting that story structures are relatively ineffective in closing
arguments.
Pretrial Publicity
A second methodology through which race may be made salient is pretrial publicity.
Pretrial publicity refers to any coverage or discussion of a court case that occurs in the media
(e.g., television, newspapers, and magazines) prior to the onset of the trial (Otto, Penrod, &
Dexter, 1994). Although it has not been investigated in relation to race salience, pretrial
publicity’s broad effects on juror decision making are known (Otto et al., 1994). Past research
has established that pretrial publicity can influence processing of trial-relevant information such
as appraisals (Kovera, 2002) and credibility (Ruva & Guenther, 2015) of victims, defendants,
and witnesses, as well as perceptions of the case made by both the defense and the prosecution
(Otto et al., 1994). Pretrial publicity can also lead to confirmation biases in which evidence
presented at trial is interpreted based on exposure to pretrial publicity (Carlson & Russo, 2001;
Hope, Memon, & McGeorge, 2004), and research indicates that this bias can benefit both the
defense and the prosecution (Kovera, 2002). Furthermore, pretrial publicity has been found to
affect jurors implicitly, even when they do not believe they have been affected (Moran & Cutler,
1991).
23

Along with influencing information processing throughout the trial, pretrial publicity can
also influence outcome decisions. For example, Otto et al. (1994) found that mock jurors who
viewed pretrial publicity targeting a defendant’s character were more likely to find the defendant
guilty than those who did not view the pretrial publicity, and Daftary-Kapur, Penrod, O’Connor,
and Wallace (2014) found that mock jurors’ eventual sentencing decisions were influenced by
the type of pretrial publicity they were exposed to. These findings have been echoed by others
(Dexter, Cutler, & Moran, 1992; Fein et al., 1997; Ruva & McEvoy, 2008; for a meta-analytic
review, see Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero, & Jiminez-Lorente, 1999). Along with this experimental
research, pretrial publicity’s influence on actual trial outcomes is well-established (Studebaker &
Penrod, 1997), and the effects of pretrial publicity have caused several conviction reversals for
real world trials (e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 1963; Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966).
Importantly, pretrial publicity can affect juror decision making throughout the course of a
trial. In their meta-analysis of the pretrial publicity literature, Steblay et al. (1999) found
significant pretrial publicity effects on juror decision making prior to the trial, at the conclusion
of the trial, and after jury deliberation had occurred; the persistence at these later stages suggests
that evidence presented at trial and group deliberation are insufficient to eliminate the effects of
pretrial publicity (and may instead be used to confirm the juror’s pretrial beliefs; Hope et al.,
2004). Research suggests that the biasing effect of pretrial publicity persists even when jurors are
explicitly made aware through voir dire (Dexter et al., 1992) and juror instructions (DaftaryKapur et al., 2014) of the potential effects pretrial publicity may have on their decision making.
Although the race salience effect has not been investigated using a pretrial publicity
manipulation, there is evidence to suggest that making race salient through this medium would
be effective. For instance, research by Otto et al. (1994) indicates that pretrial publicity targeting
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the defendant’s character is especially powerful. Similarly, the race salience effect is known to
increase negative feelings toward the defendant’s character (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000); thus,
a pretrial publicity manipulation may be particularly effective. In addition, Fein et al. (1997)
found pretrial publicity effects reminiscent of the race salience effect: mock jurors were more
likely to convict a Black defendant after exposure to pretrial publicity, but only when the
defendant’s race was not highlighted in the publicity piece. When the defendant’s race was
highlighted, mock jurors’ eventual decisions were not impacted by pretrial publicity exposure. In
other words, making race salient caused these mock jurors to essentially ignore the pretrial
publicity and evaluate the case based only on information from the trial. While this is not a true
investigation of the race salience effect because there is no comparison condition with White
defendants, Fein et al.’s (1997) results further support the possible effectiveness of making race
salient through this medium.
Group-Level Decision Making
Along with the lack of research on different manipulations, another important limitation
of the race salience effect literature is that the effects of race salience on jury-level decision
making are currently unclear (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). Although juror-level effects are
important, courtroom decisions are typically made by a jury acting together, not by individual
jurors (Devine et al., 2001). Furthermore, the processes underlying individual- and group-level
decision making are not the same (Nunez, McCrea, & Culhane, 2011); hence, a jury-level race
salience effect cannot be assumed simply because a juror-level effect has been found. One prior
study has investigated the race salience effect at the jury level (Sommers, 2006); however,
particulars of the study design, and the fact that only one jury-level investigation exists, warrants
further examination of race salience’s jury-level effects.
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Discussions of group-level decision making in the courtroom often involve extrapolating
results from individual jurors to juries (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994). For example, in an
investigation of comprehension and defendant race, Lynch and Haney (2000) concluded that
juror instruction comprehension was related to racial discrimination in capital sentencing trials.
They also applied their results to both juror decision making and “capital jury decision-making”
(Lynch & Haney, 2000, p. 353), effectively extrapolating their results to jury decision making
even though participants did not convene as a jury. Statements equating individual- and grouplevel decision making in juries have also been made in the race salience literature; Kleider et al.
(2012), for example, consistently apply their findings to jury trials even though they only
investigated the decision making processes of individual jurors (the authors do note that their
study did not examine the role of deliberation).
Even though researchers (Diamond, 1997; Nunez et al., 2011) and professionals in the
court system (Saks & Marti, 1997) often underestimate or conflate juror- and jury-level decision
making, the literature suggests that the two levels are fundamentally different. At the juror level,
decisions of guilt are driven by factors including individual difference characteristics such as
authoritarianism and socioeconomic status (Devine & Caughlin, 2014); cognitive factors such as
comprehension of instructions (Lynch & Haney, 2000); moral convictions (Skitka & Houston,
2001); ingroup biases (Kerr, Hymes, Anderson, & Weathers, 1995); and preexisting beliefs about
the justice system (Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 1984), social issues (Lord et al., 1979), the
defendant, and the victim (Carlson & Russo, 2001). At the jury level, these factors continue to
affect the final decision made by the group (Devine et al., 2001). However, jury decisions are
also affected by characteristics unique to group-level decision making. For example, groups are
susceptible to social loafing, in which each person within the group puts forth less individual
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effort than they would have had they worked alone (Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979).
Similarly, group members may engage in groupthink, where consensus decisions are made with
little individual effort in order to enhance the cohesiveness of the group (Mullen, Anthony, Salas,
& Driskell, 1994). Properties of the group itself, such as group size and group composition (Kerr
& Tindale, 2004), can also affect the decision making process in groups. All of these aspects of
groups have been identified in the decision making process of juries (Devine et al., 2001;
Henningsen, Cruz, & Miller, 2000; Kameda & Sugimori, 1993). Thus, although juror-level
variables have some impact on jury decisions (Devine et al., 2001), the uniqueness of jury
decision making is clear.
In the courtroom, group decision making occurs through jury deliberation, the primary
purpose of the jury process (Ellsworth, 1989). During deliberation, jurors convene and discuss
the trial (considering, e.g., evidence, possible sentences, and judicial instructions) and reach a
(typically unanimous) decision of guilt (Devine et al., 2001; for research on group decision
making using other decision rules, see Kameda, 1991). While this process does not necessarily
lead to a better understanding of the law, research has shown that deliberation often leads to
correct decisions regarding the quality of evidence presented in the case (Ellsworth, 1989).
Research on jury deliberation has identified many group-level factors that influence a jury’s
effectiveness including jury diversity (Sommers, 2006), pre-deliberation attitudes toward the
case (Tindale, Davis, Vollrath, Nagao, & Hinsz, 1990), decision rules (Davis, Hulbert, Au, Chen,
& Zarnoth, 1997), jury size (Saks & Marti, 1997), group decision momentum (Lynch & Haney,
2009), characteristics of the jury foreperson (Devine et al., 2001), and the content of the
deliberation itself (Sommers, 2006).
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Past research suggests that jury deliberation could theoretically have both an attenuating
and an exacerbating impact on the race salience effect. For example, pressures of conformity
(Nunez et al., 2011) and social loafing (Latane et al., 1979) may cause jurors to expend less
effort into understanding connections between the case facts and the relevance of race to the
case, nullifying any race salience manipulation. In addition, because the most persuasive juror in
a jury setting is the one who is most confident, not most accurate (Ellsworth, 1989), those jurors
who created a link between race and the case could have that link nullified by a confident,
persuasive juror who disagrees. On the other hand, a confident juror who believed that race was
relevant to the case could instead lead to an even stronger race salience effect. Furthermore,
because acting on a jury increases jurors’ feelings of accountability (Hazelwood & Brigham,
1998), each individual juror may be wary of appearing racist to their fellow jury members,
causing them to consider their explicit biases more strongly and enhancing the race salience
effect.
Perhaps the clearest mechanism through which the race salience effect may impact final
jury decisions is by altering pre-deliberation beliefs regarding verdict preferences. Research
indicates that the most influential factor on jury deliberations is which verdict has the predeliberation majority and how strong this majority is (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Sandys &
Dillehay, 1995; Tindale et al., 1990). For example, in a survey of actual jury trials, Sandys and
Dillehay (1995) found that the final verdict reached by the jury matched the pre-deliberation
majority verdict 93% of the time. This effect is also a function of majority size: in an analysis of
the pre-deliberation majority effect conducted by Devine et al. (2001), the authors concluded that
larger majorities (e.g., 11 guilty, 1 not guilty) almost never waver from their pre-deliberation
decision, while smaller majorities (e.g., 7 guilty, 5 not guilty) are more willing to change their
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minds. There is also evidence that deliberation has significant impacts on jurors’ pre-deliberation
judgments regardless of majority size (Nunez et al., 2011).
The role of the pre-deliberation majority is especially important in understanding how
race salience may affect the final jury decision. Because of its probabilistic nature, the race
salience effect does not cause all White jurors to sentence Black defendants without prejudice
(Sommers & Ellsworth, 2009). Thus, in a criminal case involving a Black defendant, it is
unlikely that race salience would have an effect on all members of a jury. Rather, the impact of
race salience on each of the affected White jurors’ pre-deliberation judgments could alter the predeliberation majority unequally favoring guilt (or harsher punishment) for a Black defendant
compared to a White defendant. In other words, race salience may affect jury decision making by
altering the size (or direction) of the pre-deliberation majority in cases with Black defendants.
However, the effect of race salience at the group level has not yet been thoroughly
investigated. In fact, only one previous study (Sommers, 2006) has approached the question, and
this study did not manipulate race salience in a way that group-level effects could be adequately
investigated. Sommers (2006) manipulated race salience using unique voir dire questions where
the effects of a jurors’ racial biases to influence the case were highlighted (e.g., “Do you have
any biases or prejudices that might prevent you from judging an African American defendant
fairly?” Sommers, 2006, p. 602). The author’s results suggested that a race salience effect may
be present, as participants who received the race salience manipulation rendered more lenient
pre-deliberation verdicts for the defendant (who was Black) than participants who did not receive
the manipulation. However, the author failed to include a White defendant condition in the study.
This is an important limitation because the race salience effect states that trial outcomes will
become equalized between White and Black defendants when race is made salient. Because
29

Sommers (2006) did not include a White defendant, these critical comparisons cannot be made
and a true effect cannot be concluded. In addition to an individual juror investigation, the
Sommers (2006) study also investigated the race salience effect at the jury level. However,
conclusions could not be drawn because there was little diversity in final verdict across all
conditions with only one jury voting to convict the defendant. However, even if Sommers (2006)
had found an effect, these jury-level effects would be qualified by several factors. First, only 29
juries (split across four conditions) were included in the jury-level analyses, meaning that any
analyses conducted would have low power to detect significant differences. Second, Sommers
(2006) was simultaneously investigating the role of racial diversity in the deliberation process.
Because racial diversity is known to have its own unique impact on deliberations (Sommers,
2007), the inclusion of this variable makes interpretation of the jury-level race salience effect
more difficult.
The Current Studies
In their review of the literature, Sommers and Ellsworth (2009) noted several unanswered
questions regarding the race salience effect. Several of these issues center around questions of
external validity, including the lack of methodological variety in how race was made salient and
concerns about how race salience affects overall jury decisions, if at all. In other words, although
the effect has been experimentally demonstrated and replicated, its applicability to real life court
cases is currently limited.
This dissertation aimed to extend the race salience literature and address the gaps noted
by Sommers and Ellsworth (2009) in two ways. First, the race salience effect was investigated
when introduced through attorney statements and pretrial publicity. The majority of past research
(Cohn et al., 2009; Kemmelmeier, 2005; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001) has evoked race salience
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through witness statements, the same manipulation used in Sommers and Ellsworth’s (2000)
initial study. By investigating alternative manipulations, the current studies can explore whether
the race salience effect is isolated to the specific methods explored previously or whether its
effects are widely applicable within a trial setting.
Second, the race salience effect was examined with a methodology incorporating jury
deliberation. Although individual juror effects are important, jurors rarely make decisions by
themselves in actual court cases; furthermore, the decision making processes involved in group
decisions are different than those of the individual (Devine et al., 2001). Thus, an understanding
of how race salience affects group decision making in the courtroom is imperative.
Experiment 1 Hypotheses
Experiment 1 investigated the race salience effect within the context of attorney
statements and jury deliberation. Experiment 1 employed a 2 (defendant race: White vs. Black) x
4 (race salience: Salient Opening vs. Salient Closing vs. Salient Both vs. Non-Salient) factorial
design, controlling for mock jurors’ levels of modern racism (McConahay, 1986), social
dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and beliefs regarding the
strength of the cases made by the defense and prosecution, (Cohn et al., 2009; Kemmelmeier,
2005; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). At the post-deliberation stage, mock jurors’ pre-deliberation
responses to the dependent variables were also controlled for.
Based on Bucolo and Cohn’s (2010) investigation of race salience within opening
statements, research on the nature of attorney statements in general (Diamond et al., 1996;
Spiecker & Worthington, 2003), cognitive schemas and prototypes (Bransford & Johnson, 1972;
Smith, 1991), and the story model of juror decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1986), I
predicted:
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Experiment 1, Hypothesis 1: When race was not salient in defense attorney statements,
White mock jurors would give stronger sentencing, guilt, and defendant character
judgments to Black compared to White defendants;
Experiment 1, Hypothesis 2: For White mock jurors, manipulating race salience in
defense opening statements only would equalize sentencing, guilt, and defendant
judgments for White and Black defendants;
Experiment 1, Hypothesis 3: For White mock jurors, manipulating race salience in
defense closing arguments only would fail to equalize sentencing, guilt, and defendant
judgments for White and Black defendants, with Black defendants receiving stronger
guilt and sentencing judgments; and
Experiment 1, Hypothesis 4: For White mock jurors, there would be no difference in
sentencing, guilt, and defendant judgments between when race was made salient through
defense opening statements only and when race was made salient through both defense
opening statements and closing arguments.
Experiment 1 also investigated the race salience effect following jury deliberations. There
is empirical justification both for and against the juror-level race salience effect having an impact
on overall jury decisions (Devine et al., 2001; Hazelwood & Brigham, 1998; Sandys & Dillehay,
1995; Sommers, 2006). However, the research on pre-deliberation judgments (e.g., Tindale et al.,
1990) seems most useful for predicting how race salience will affect group-level judgments.
Specifically, I predicted:
Experiment 1, Hypothesis 5: For juries where race was made salient through opening
statements, or through opening statements and closing arguments, pre-deliberation
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sentencing, guilt, and defendant judgments would remain equalized for White and Black
defendants after jury deliberation;
Experiment 1, Hypothesis 6: For juries where race was not made salient, or where race
was made salient through closing arguments only, pre-deliberation sentencing, guilt, and
defendant judgments would remain unequal for White and Black defendants after jury
deliberation, with Black defendants receiving stronger guilt and sentencing judgments;
and
Experiment 1, Hypothesis 7: After deliberation, members of juries where race was made
salient through opening statements, or through opening statements and closing
arguments, would be more likely to change their verdict compared to members of juries
where race is not made salient, or where race is made salient through closing arguments
only.
Experiment 2 Hypotheses
Experiment 2 investigated pretrial publicity as a second potential manipulation of the race
salience effect. This experiment utilized a 2 (defendant race: White vs. Black) x 2 (race salience:
Salient vs. Non-Salient) factorial design in which race was made salient exclusively within two
pretrial publicity news articles, controlling for the same variables as in Experiment 1. Because no
prior research has established pretrial publicity as an effective race salience manipulation, no
jury deliberation occurred in Experiment 2. Based on research showing persistent effects of
pretrial publicity in general (Steblay et al., 1999) and the suggestive findings regarding race
salience by Fein et al. (1997), I predicted:
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Experiment 2, Hypothesis 1: When race was not made salient through pretrial publicity,
White mock jurors would give stronger sentencing, guilt, and defendant judgments to
Black defendants compared to White defendants; and
Experiment 2, Hypothesis 2: For White mock jurors, manipulating race salience through
pretrial publicity would equalize sentencing, guilt, and defendant judgments for White
and Black defendants.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants
For Experiment 1, minimum sample size was determined using an a priori power
analysis using G*Power 3.1.9 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Using this program, it
was determined that 250 participants would be necessary to identify medium effect sizes with 
= .05 and power = .80.
In total, Experiment 1 consisted of 264 jury-eligible White students at the University of
North Dakota who participated in the study for credit toward completion of introductory-level
psychology courses. Of these, one was excluded for being under 18 years of age, four were
excluded from analyses for not being U.S. citizens, 11 were excluded from analyses for failing to
respond to several items and 41 were excluded for failing both manipulation checks. Thus,
analyses for Experiment 1 included 207 participants (Mage = 19.57, SD = 1.84; 66.7% female; see
Table 1 for full demographic information). Participants in Experiment 1 were randomly assigned
to one condition in a 2 (defendant race: White vs. Black) x 4 (race salience: Opening and Closing
vs. Opening Only vs. Closing Only vs. Not Salient) factorial design, with cell sizes ranging from
23 (Closing Only, White Defendant) to 32 (Opening Only, White Defendant).
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Table 1
Participant Demographics, Experiment 1f
Variable

Mean/Frequency (SD/%)

Age (18-45)

19.57 (1.84)

Sex (% Women)

138 (66.7%)

Strength of Religious Beliefs (1-7)

4.61 (1.77)

Political Orientation (1-7)

3.70 (1.41)

Served on a Jury? (% Yes)

1 (.5%)

Been Victim of a Crime? (% Yes)

19 (9.2%)

Witnessed a Crime? (% Yes)

33 (15.9%)

Trial Simulation
Past investigations of the race salience effect have typically used brief trial materials
focused on one or two aspects of the trial. For example, materials for the two initial examinations
(Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001) both consisted of short (0.5 to 1.5 pages) summaries of the
crime and witness statements for the defense and prosecution. While these materials are
sufficient to investigate the race salience effect in isolation, they do not attempt to simulate the
complexity of actual trials, in which information is diverse in form and source (Bornstein, 1999).
Toward enhancing ecological validity, a basic trial transcript integrating excerpts from
several actual phases of a court case (see Appendix A) was created based on a sample mock trial
provided by the Michigan Center for Civic Education (n.d.) and jury instructions provided by the
8th Circuit District Court (2014). Specifically, the trial transcript included excerpts from pretrial
judicial instructions, witness statements from the defense and prosecution, visual exhibits, and
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post-trial jury instructions. In addition to this core transcript, Experiment 1 included excerpts
from the opening statements and closing arguments for both the defense and prosecuting
attorneys. The simulated case involved an accusation of assault with a deadly weapon in which
the defendant pleads self-defense.
Since an unbalanced transcript could potentially mask manipulation effects, five pilot
studies were conducted on the trial transcript to ensure balanced verdicts and variability in
responses prior to the inclusion of any manipulations. In the first three pilot studies, several
versions of the core trial transcript (without attorney statements or pretrial publicity) were tested,
each differing slightly with respect to key elements of the case (e.g., one version listed Jaclyn
Bardie, a defense witness, as a stranger rather than an ex-girlfriend of the defendant).
Participants were either undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses at the University
of North Dakota (Pilot Study 1; N = 87) or a sample of individuals from around the United States
recruited online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Pilot Study 2 and 3; Total N =
200). After reading the transcript, participants responded to questions regarding their verdict
preference (guilty vs. not guilty), their level of confidence in that verdict (using a 7-point scale,
with higher scores indicating higher confidence), and their beliefs about the guilt of the
defendant (using a 7-point scale, with higher scores indicating higher defendant guilt). Results
using the final version of the transcript suggested that verdict preference was equally balanced
between guilty (51.2%) and acquittal verdicts; in addition, verdict confidence (M = 5.46, SD =
1.29) and defendant guilt ratings (M = 4.34, SD = 1.93) were normally distributed, suggesting
that the transcript would be able to capture a race salience effect if one existed.
Once the core trial transcript was established, a fourth pilot study was conducted through
MTurk in which attorney statements (Pilot Study 4; see Appendix B) was added to the transcript
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to ensure that their inclusion did not alter the balance of the transcript. Verdict preferences
remained balanced in Pilot Study 4 (N = 92; 53.3% guilty), and verdict confidence (MPilot 4 =
5.61, SD = 1.10) and defendant guilt ratings (MPilot 4 = 4.53, SD = 2.00) retained similar values to
those obtained with the core transcript.
A fifth pilot study (N = 47) was conducted in which the transcript was modified to
highlight the race of the defendant and plaintiff. Specifically, modifications included changing
the character’s names to be more stereotypically White or Black (based on Levitt & Dubner,
2005) and the addition of demographic information (similar to that used in Sommers &
Ellsworth, 2000) about the defendant and plaintiff, including information about the character’s
race. Because defendant race is a manipulation of both experiments, half of the participants in
this pilot study read the transcript with a Black defendant and a White plaintiff and half read the
transcript with a White defendant and a Black plaintiff. Participants correctly recalled the race of
the defendant in 45 cases (95.74%) and the race of the plaintiff in 41 cases (87.23%). Thus, the
trial transcripts for Experiment 1, and the names and demographic characteristics of the
characters in the trial were accepted.
Race Salience Manipulation
In Experiment 1, race salience was manipulated through statements made by the defense
attorney. For participants in the Opening Only condition, two sentences (based partially on
Bucolo & Cohn, 2010) were added to the defense attorney’s opening statement: “Quite frankly,
ladies and gentlemen, if [Scott/Jamal] were not [White/Black] and [Jamal/Scott] were not
[Black/White], we would not be in this room today,” and, “The only reason [Scott/Jamal] is on
trial today and not [Jamal/Scott] is because [Scott/Jamal] is [White/Black] and [Jamal/Scott] is
[Black/White].” For participants in the Closing Only condition, two sentences were added to the
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defense attorney’s closing argument: “These facts do not change simply because [Scott/Jamal] is
[White/Black] and [Jamal/Scott] is [Black/White],” and, “The definition of self-defense is the
same for us all, regardless of the color of our skin.” Participants in the Opening and Closing
condition read defense attorney statements with the race salient sentences included during both
the opening statement and the closing argument. Participants in the Not Salient condition read
defense attorney statements with none of the race salient sentences included. Attorney statements
made by the prosecutor were identical across condition.
Dependent Variables
Juror Questionnaire.
Mock jurors in Experiment 1 completed a questionnaire assessing punitive outcomes,
beliefs about the case, and beliefs about the defendant using items taken from past race salience
studies (Sommers and Ellsworth, 2000; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001; Sommers, 2006; see
Appendix C). Participants rated how guilty they believe the defendant to be (1 = not at all, 9 =
completely), which dichotomous verdict choice they preferred (0 = not guilty, 1 = guilty), and
their recommended sentence length in years and months. Participants were provided with the
United States Sentencing Commission’s (2015) recommended sentence lengths for both simple
and aggravated assault to guide their decision. Given that any participant choosing a not guilty
verdict would likely choose a sentence of 0 years, and that verdict choice was expected to be
different across condition, sentencing recommendations were only analyzed for participants who
chose a guilty verdict (Npre-deliberation = 125; Npost-deliberation = 130).
Participants also indicated how violent and aggressive they believed the defendant to be
using a 9-point scale (1 = not at all violent/aggressive, 9 = very violent/aggressive). Finally,
using 7-point scales, participants responded to items regarding the strength of the defense and
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prosecution’s cases (1 = very weak, 7 = very strong; see Table 2 for pre-deliberation descriptive
statistics).
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables and Covariates, Experiment 1
Variable

Pre-Deliberation

Post-Deliberation

Guilt (1-7)

4.46 (1.47)

4.58 (1.83)

Verdict Choice (% Guilty)

126 (60.9%)

130 (62.8%)

Sentence Length (years)a

11.93 (10.34)

12.15 (10.69)

Defendant Violence (1-9)

4.74 (1.83)

5.03 (1.97)

Defendant Aggressiveness
(1-9)

5.14 (1.87)

5.37 (2.03)

Defense Case Strength
(1-7)

4.20 (1.26)

4.04 (1.34)

Prosecution Case Strength
(1-7)

4.66 (1.20)

4.55 (1.39)

Racial Motivation (1-7)

3.11 (1.71)

2.69 (1.72)

Modern Racism (1-5)

2.37 (.60)

-----

Social Dominance
2.46 (.96)
----Orientation (1-7)
a
: Sentence Length responses are only included for participants who reached a guilty verdict.
Jury Variables.
In Experiment 1, after responding individually to the Juror Questionnaire, participants
convened as a jury to deliberate. Following deliberation, the experimenter collected basic jury
characteristic data (see Appendix D). Specifically, data were gathered about the final verdict
reached by the jury, the timeslot associated with the jury (in order to identify which condition the
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jury was associated with), the size of the jury, the gender breakdown of the jury, the length of
jury deliberation, and the participant number associated with the jury foreperson.
However, none of these group-level variables were assessed in relation to the hypotheses
of the study. This decision was made based on feasibility because, according to a G*Power
analysis (Faul et al., 2009), a true jury simulation with adequate power would require at least 720
mock jurors in Experiment 1. Rather, this information was collected to better understand the
demographics of the average jury and to conduct post-hoc analyses related to group-level
decision making in general.
Instead, hypotheses regarding the effects of jury deliberation were assessed using a
procedure outlined by Miller, Maskaly, Green, and Peoples (2011). In their study, participants
were asked to respond individually to questions about a court cases, deliberate as a jury, and then
individually answer the same questions that they had before. The authors assessed group-level
effects by examining differences between pre- and post-deliberation responses across conditions.
Although there are fundamental differences between this procedure and a true test of jury
decision making (e.g., it does not require a unanimous decision from the jurors; Devine et al.,
2001), this procedure allows an approximation of whether jury deliberations lead to more or less
attitude change when following a race salience manipulation. Therefore, the effects of
deliberation were assessed by collecting responses to the Juror Questionnaire a second time (see
Table 2 for post-deliberation descriptive statistics).
Covariates
Modern Racism.
Both experiments utilized McConahay’s (1986) Modern Racism Scale (MRS; Experiment1
= .81) to control for the effects of explicit racism on trial outcome variables (Bucolo & Cohn,
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2010; Cohn et al., 2009). MRS is a six-item scale measuring beliefs about race relations in the
United States. Participants responded using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree), with higher scores indicating higher levels of modern racism; item 2 was reverse-coded.
An example item from this scale is, “It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in
America” (see Appendix E for all items and Table 2 for descriptive statistics).
Social Dominance Orientation.
Past research using race salience materials indicates that social dominance orientation
(SDO; Pratto et al., 1994; Experiment1 = .91) is an important variable for White mock jurors during
interracial trial scenarios (Kemmelmeier, 2005). The SDO scale (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin,
2006) is a 16-item scale measuring an individual’s preference for group inequality and a
dominant status for the ingroup. Participants in both experiments responded using a 7-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), with higher scores indicating higher levels of SDO;
items 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, and 16 were reverse-coded. An example item from this scale is, “To
get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups” (see Appendix F for all items
and Table 2 for descriptive statistics).
Post-Trial Questionnaire
In addition to these measures, a post-trial questionnaire (Appendix G) was given to all
participants. Within this questionnaire, participants responded to demographics items about their
age, sex, religious beliefs, political orientation, and citizenship status. Participants also responded
to questions regarding previous jury service and experience as both a witness to and a victim of
assault in the past. The Post-Trial Questionnaire also included two manipulation check items and
one item assessing whether participants knew the purpose of the study.
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Procedure
Before completing the main portion of Experiment 1, participants completed the MRS
and SDO scales (Appendices E and F) as part of a prescreen survey offered through Sona
Systems, the University of North Dakota’s (UND) online participant management software.
Participant data from these scales was downloaded and stored on secure computers located in Dr.
Andre Kehn’s laboratory space.
Prior to the experiment, each planned timeslot was randomly assigned to one of eight
conditions. Each timeslot allowed for up to eight participants. Participants signed up for the
study through UND’s Sona Systems software and completed the experiment in the Applied
Social Cognition Laboratory in Robertson-Sayre Hall.
Participation occurred in groups of at least four, but no more than eight, to ensure
adequate jury deliberation was possible (Miller et al., 2011). A jury size of four to eight jurors
was chosen for several reasons. First, several past studies have used similar jury sizes (Devine et
al., 2001; Miller et al., 2001; Tindale et al., 1990). Second, the literature suggests that juries of at
least four, and preferably six, people have similar decision making processes and reach similar
solutions as full juries (Horowitz & Bordens, 2002; Saks & Marti, 1997; Tindale et al., 1990).
Finally, concerns with obtaining a consistent attendance of twelve jurors made a full jury
simulation unfeasible. Experiment 1 and 2 were conducted concurrently. Because at least four
participants were required for Experiment 1, if fewer than four participants arrived for a given
timeslot, they were automatically enrolled in Experiment 2.
Stage 1: Juror Phase.
Participation occurred in three stages. Once participants arrived, they were seated in a
chair around a table. The experimenter then provided participants with a statement of consent
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and basic instructions on completing the study. Participants were then given packets containing
all materials related to the trial transcript (Appendices A and B) and read through them at their
own pace. Participants first read the pretrial order and pretrial instructions from the judge. Then,
they read opening statements from the prosecuting and defense attorneys. For participants in the
Opening and Closing and Opening Only conditions, the defense’s opening statement included
two sentences about the salience of race to the case. Next, participants read the witness
statements, exhibits, and post-trial instructions from the judge. Finally, participants read closing
arguments from the defense and prosecution. For those in the Closing Only and Opening and
Closing conditions, the defense’s closing argument included two sentences manipulating race
salience. After reading all materials, participants completed the Juror Questionnaire (Appendix
C).
Stage 2: Jury Deliberation.
After completing Stage 1, participants convened as a jury and deliberated for up to 20
minutes. Prior to deliberation, an experimenter read jury instructions from the 8th Circuit District
Court (2014; see Appendix H). Mock juries were encouraged to reach a consensus decision, as is
typical in actual court cases (Devine et al., 2001). However, because the hypotheses of
Experiment 1 did not involve any jury-level analyses, a consensus decision was not required and
was only recorded as such for post-hoc jury-level analyses.
Stage 3: Post-Deliberation.
After jury deliberation ended, participants completed the Juror Questionnaire individually
a second time. Finally, participants completed the Post-Trial Questionnaire (Appendix G) and
were debriefed and given credit for their participation.
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
Prior to testing the hypotheses of Experiment 1, preliminary analyses were conducted to
ensure that the data met linear model assumptions, that demographics had no meaningful impact
on responses to dependent variables, that correlations between covariates and dependent
variables were at acceptable levels, and that the race salience manipulations were effective.
All continuous data in Experiment 1 were tested for normality and homogeneity of
variance. All skewness and kurtosis values for variables were less than +/- 1.96, indicating strong
evidence for normally distributed data (Field, 2013). To test for homogeneity of variance,
Levene’s test for equality of error variances was conducted on each of the DVs before and after
deliberation. Pre-deliberation, none of the DVs displayed issues with heterogeneity (Fguilt = .70;
Fsentence = 2.05; Fviolent = 1.44; Faggressive = .35; all ns); post-deliberation responses for sentencing
recommendations (F = .84) and defendant character ratings of violence (F = 1.21) and
aggressiveness (F = 1.82, all ns) were also homogeneous.
Evidence of heterogeneity of variance was found for post-deliberation guilt ratings (F =
5.21, p < .001). To statistically correct for heterogeneity, a square root data transformation was
conducted on the variable; this solution did not correct the issue (F = 5.17, p < .001). Reciprocal
and exponent data transformations were then attempted. However, data remained heterogeneous
in all transformations (Freciprocal = 4.82; Fexponent = 7.05, both ps < .001). Therefore, analyses on
post-deliberation guilt ratings were conducted using untransformed variables. Because of the
homogeneity of variance results, all analyses involving this variable should be interpreted with
caution.
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Analyses were also conducted to ensure that demographic characteristics were equivalent
across the eight conditions. Results indicated no significant differences across condition based on
gender (2[7] = 7.17), age (F[7,199] = 1.12), strength of religious beliefs (F([7,199] = 1.31), or
political orientation (F[7,198] = 1.08, all ns).
Next, relationships between demographic characteristics and the dependent variables
were investigated pre- and post-deliberation. Due to the number of analyses conducted at this
stage, each test was analyzed with a Bonferroni corrected critical value of p = .002 (28 total tests
with  = .05). Given the large number of tests conducted on the demographic variables and the
fact that no a priori hypotheses were made for relationships between demographics and
dependent variables, the Bonferroni correction is appropriate to decrease the likelihood of a Type
1 error when interpreting results (Field, 2013).
Nonsignificant relationships were found between all but one of the pre-deliberation DVs
and gender (2verdict [1] = .82; tguilt [205] = -.47; tsentence [123] = -1.05; tviolent [205] = -2.47;
taggressive [205] = -1.45), age (guilt = .19; sentence = -.04; violent = .04; aggressive = .10), strength of
religious beliefs (guilt = .09; sentence = -.04; violent = .03; aggressive = .07), and political orientation
(guilt = .07; sentence = -.02; aggressive = .16; all ps > .002). A significant relationship was found
between political orientation and pre-deliberation violence ratings ( = .21, p = .002), such that
the more liberal a participant’s political orientation, the more likely they were to believe the
defendant to have a violent character prior to deliberation.
Nonsignificant relationships were also found between all post-deliberation DVs and
gender (2verdict [1] = 5.00; tguilt [121.06] = -2.42; tsentence [128] = .00; tviolent [205] = -2.35; taggressive
[205] = -2.25), age (guilt = .10; sentence = .06; violent = .14; aggressive = .11), strength of religious
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beliefs (guilt = .07; sentence = -.03; violent = .09; aggressive = .14), and political orientation (guilt =
.10; sentence = -.01; violent = .16; aggressive = .15; all ps > .002).
It is worth nothing that, in addition to the significant pre-deliberation violence-political
orientation relationship, 11 of the 27 tests yielded results that would have been significant
without the Bonferroni correction. Specifically, using a p = .05 cutoff, gender significantly
predicted post-deliberation verdict choice (p = .03), post-deliberation guilt ratings (p = .02), postdeliberation aggressive ratings (p = .03), and both pre-deliberation (p = .01) and postdeliberation defendant violence ratings (p = .02); age predicted pre-deliberation guilt ratings (p =
.007) and post-deliberation defendant violence ratings (p = .047); religion predicted postdeliberation aggressiveness ratings (p = .04); and political orientation predicted post-deliberation
violence ratings (p = .02) and both pre- (p = .02) and post-deliberation aggressiveness ratings (p
= .04). Regardless, no significant demographic differences were identified across condition,
meaning that even if one of these marginally significant results denotes a true relationship, the
relationship should have no impact on the main analyses.
Correlations were calculated between the covariates (modern racism, social dominance
orientation, and strength of case for the defense and prosecution) and the dependent variables to
investigate any multicollinearity issues. Results indicated that all correlations among covariates
and between covariates and DVs were at acceptable levels (highest pre-deliberation r = .60, postdeliberation r = .61; see Tables 3 and 4 for all correlations).
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Table 3
Pre-Deliberation Correlations Among Covariates and Dependent Variables, Experiment 1
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Guilt

---

2. Sentence
Length

.09

---

3. Verdict

.77**

N/Aa

---

4. Defendant
Violence

.55**

.03

.41**

---

5. Defendant
Aggressiveness

.63**

-.12

.50**

.80**

6. Case of
Defense

-.50**

-.10

-.49** -.24** -.26**

7. Case of
Prosecution

.60**

.04

.56**

.44**

.43**

-.37**

---

8. Modern
Racism

.01

.15

.05

-.08

-.02

-.07

.03

8

---

---

---

9. Social
-.03
-.04
.00
-.03
.04
-.02
-.04
.54**
Dominance
Orientation
Note: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; a = Only guilty responses were used for sentence
recommendation analyses, so no correlation can be calculated.
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9

---

Table 4
Post-Deliberation Correlations Among Covariates and Dependent Variables, Experiment 1
1

1. Guilt

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

---

2. Sentence
Length

.25**

---

3. Verdict

.84**

N/Aa

---

4. Defendant
Violence

.67**

.06

.59**

---

5. Defendant
Aggressiveness

.70**

.19*

.60**

.86**

6. Case of
Defense

-.33**

-.01

-.34** -.24** -.21**

7. Case of
Prosecution

.61**

.01

.56**

.47**

.49**

-.31**

---

8. Modern
Racism

-.04

.20*

-.01

-.05

-.05

.08

-.05

---

---

---

9. Social
-.06
-.09
-.01
.04
.03
.01
-.11
.54**
Dominance
Orientation
Note: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; a = Only guilty responses were used for sentence

---

recommendation analyses, so no correlation can be calculated.
Finally, an analysis was conducted to ensure that the race salience manipulation was
noticed by participants in the race salience conditions. Within the Post-Trial Questionnaire,
participants were asked to respond to an open-ended manipulation check question: “Did the
attorney statements you read mention anything about the defendant’s race being relevant to the
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court case? If so, what did they say?” In order to test the effectiveness of the manipulations,
responses to this question were coded dichotomously (1 = race was relevant, 2 = race was not
relevant) and this dichotomous variable was entered into a 2 analysis comparing participants in
the race salience conditions against participants in the Not Salient condition. Results indicated a
significant relationship between condition and remembering attorney statements about race,
2[1] = 73.93, p < .001; participants in the Race Salient conditions were more likely to recall
statements about race than would be expected by chance (71.4% recall), while participants in the
Not Salient condition were less likely to recall statements about race than expected by chance
(0% recall).
Pre-Deliberation Analyses
To investigate Hypotheses 1-4 of Experiment 1, four 2 x 4 analyses of covariance
(ANCOVAs) were conducted using defendant race (White vs. Black) and race salience (Opening
and Closing, Opening Only, Closing Only, and Not Salient) as IVs; mean scores on modern
racism and social dominance orientation and pre-deliberation ratings of case strength for the
defense and prosecution entered as covariates; and the four continuous pre-deliberation
dependent variables (guilt ratings, sentence length, defendant violent character rating, and
defendant aggressiveness character rating) entered as DVs in separate analyses. A significant
interaction effect would signal evidence of an overall race salience effect but is not sufficient to
draw conclusions about Hypotheses 1-4. Therefore, for any significant interactions, simple
effects analyses were used to analyze defendant race at each level of race salience and more
thoroughly test the hypotheses.
For guilt ratings, there was a main effect of defendant race, F(1,194) = 6.94, p = .009, p2
= .04; ignoring the effect of race salience, Black defendants (M = 4.03, SD = 1.46) were rated as
50

less guilty than White defendants (M = 4.84, SD = 1.39). There was no main effect of race
salience, F(3,194) = .69, ns, and no interaction between the IVs, F(3,194) = .74, ns. Thus,
Hypotheses 1-4 were not supported in relation to guilt ratings.
For sentencing recommendations when the defendant was found guilty, there was no
main effect of defendant race (F[1,113] = .01) or race salience (F[3,113] = 1.74), and no
interaction effect was identified (F[3,113] = .37, all ns). Thus, Hypotheses 1-4 were not
supported in relation to sentencing recommendations.
Defendant character ratings echoed the results for guilt ratings. For ratings of the
defendant’s violent character, a main effect of defendant race was identified, F(1,194) = 3.96, p
= .048, p2 = .02, such that the Black defendant was rated as less violent (M = 4.35, SD = 1.69)
compared to the White defendant (M = 5.10, SD = 1.90). However, there was no main effect of
race salience (F[3,194] = .49), and there was no interaction between the IVs (F[3,194] = .53,
both ns). For defendant aggressiveness ratings, a main effect of defendant race was also found
(F[1,194] = 4.74, p = .03, p2 = .02); the Black defendant was rated as less aggressive (M = 4.71,
SD = 1.82) compared to the White defendant (M = 5.53, SD = 1.84). No evidence was found for
a main effect of race salience (F[3,194] = .66) or for an interaction effect (F[3,194] = .57, both
ns). Therefore, results for both character rating variables Hypotheses 1-4 of Experiment 1.
To test Hypotheses 1-4 using the pre-deliberation dichotomous DV, four 2 analyses
were conducted, one for each level of the race salience variable, with defendant race (White vs.
Black) and pre-deliberation verdict choice (Guilty vs. Not Guilty) included in the analysis. In
support of the hypotheses, I expected to find a significant 2 when race was not salient
(Hypothesis 1) and when race was made salient only through closing arguments (Hypothesis 3),
with Black defendants being found guilty at a higher rate than expected by chance. I also
51

expected to find a nonsignificant 2 when race was made salient in both opening statements and
closing arguments (Hypothesis 4) and when race was made salient in opening statements only
(Hypothesis 2). 
Results from the 2 analyses revealed a race salience effect, but not in the predicted
direction. When race was not salient at all, there was no relationship between defendant race and
verdict choice, 2(1) = .84, ns. On the other hand, in the Opening and Closing condition and the
Closing Only condition, significant relationships were found (2open/close[1] = 3.80, p = .05,
Cramer’s V = .14; 2close[1] = 5.84, p = .02, Cramer’s V = .17), suggesting evidence of a race
salience effect in verdict choice. However, this finding is qualified in several ways. First,
although the effect was found for two of the race salience conditions, the third (Opening Only)
did not reveal the same effect (2[1] = 3.02, ns). Related to this first qualification is that the
hypotheses for Experiment 1 predicted an effect for the conditions where race was made salient
in opening statements; instead, the significant results were only identified in conditions where
race was salient in closing arguments. Finally, the “race salience effect” found in this data is
opposite that predicted and that found in most previous research (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth,
2000, 2001). Rather than equalizing trial outcomes across race, the White defendant were more
likely (and the Black defendant less likely) to be found guilty in the significant race salience
conditions. For example, in the most extreme case (the Closing Only condition), 78.3% of White
defendants but only 43.5% of Black defendants were judged as guilty pre-deliberation. In
contrast, when race was not salient, 69.6% of White defendants and 56.5% of Black defendants
were found guilty (see Table 5 for a full breakdown of all conditions). Therefore, partial support
was found for a race salience effect within pre-deliberation verdict choice, but the effect was not
the one hypothesized for Experiment 1.
52

Table 5
Pre-Deliberation Verdict Choice based on Defendant Race across Race Salience Condition,
Experiment 1
Condition

Opening and Closing

Opening Only

Closing Only

Not Salient

Verdict

Defendant Race
Black Defendant

White Defendant

Guilty

13 (48.1%)

22 (73.3%)

Not Guilty

14 (51.9%)

8 (26.7%)

Guilty

12 (46.2%)

22 (68.8%)

Not Guilty

14 (53.8%)

10 (31.2%)

Guilty

10 (43.5%)

18 (78.3%)

Not Guilty

13 (56.5%)

5 (21.7%)

Guilty

13 (56.5%)

16 (69.6%)

Not Guilty

10 (43.5%)

7 (30.4%)

Post-Deliberation Analyses
To investigate whether the results obtained prior to deliberation persisted after
participants convened as a jury, and to test Hypotheses 5 and 6 of Experiment 1, the same four
pre-deliberation analyses of covariance were conducted on the continuous post-deliberation data;
these analyses were identical except that pre-deliberation responses were controlled for by
including each DV within its respective model as a covariate.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 predicted that the race salience effects identified pre-deliberation
would continue following deliberation. Strictly speaking, both of these hypotheses are
unsupported by Experiment 1 because the pre-deliberation results did not support the expected
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race salience effects. However, a broader interpretation of these hypotheses would predict that
the results obtained pre-deliberation would remain unchanged following deliberation; this
interpretation of Hypotheses 5 and 6 is what was tested below. Therefore, it was expected that
for all continuous measures, no interaction between race salience and defendant race would be
found. In addition, I expected that for post-deliberation verdict preference, participants in the two
significant race salience conditions (Opening and Closing, and Closing Only) would continue to
disproportionately find the White defendant guilty compared to the Black defendant, and that
defendants in the other two conditions would be found guilty at the same rate across race.
For guilt ratings, there was a significant main effect of defendant race (F[1,194] = 21.10,
p < .001, p2 = .12), with the Black defendant being considered less guilty (M = 3.75, SD = 1.81)
than the White defendant (M = 5.34, SD = 1.49). The main effect of race salience was not
significant, F(3,194) = 1.25, ns. However, for post-deliberation guilt ratings, the interaction term
was significant (F[3,194] = 3.50, p = .02, p2 = .05).
A simple effects analysis was conducted on defendant race at each level of race salience
to explore the interaction. In this analysis, there was no effect of defendant race when race was
salient in both attorney statements (F[1,50] = .01) or when race was salient in closing arguments
only (F[1,39] = 1.48, both ns). However, when race was salient in opening statements only,
defendant race did influence guilt ratings (F[1,51] = 15.83, p < .001, p2 = .24), with the Black
defendant being considered less guilty (M = 3.08, SD = 1.79) compared to the White defendant
(M = 6.00, SD = 1.02). A similar relationship was found when race was not salient (F[1,39] =
5.79, p = .02, p2 = .13); the Black defendant was deemed less guilty (M = 4.22, SD = 2.37)
compared to the White defendant (M = 5.83, SD = .98; see Figure 1). This finding is intriguing
given that the two nonsignificant conditions for post-deliberation guilt ratings were the only two
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conditions to yield a pre-deliberation race salience effect within verdict choice. Regardless,
results for post-deliberation guilt ratings differed from those found prior to deliberation, a finding
that contradicts Hypotheses 5 and 6.
6.5

6
5.5
5

Opening and Closing
Opening Only

4.5

Closing Only

4

Not Salient

3.5
3
2.5
Black Defendant

White Defendant

Figure 1. Defendant race x race salience interaction on post-deliberation guilt ratings,
Experiment 1.
In contrast to pre-deliberation, post-deliberation sentencing recommendations yielded
significant main effects for both defendant race (F[1,116] = 6.50, p = .01, p2 = .05) and race
salience (F[3,116] = 4.01, p = .009, p2 = .09). Overall, when the Black defendant was found
guilty, he was given shorter sentences (M = 10.07, SD = 9.79) compared to the White defendant
(M = 12.85, SD = 10.92). In addition, when race was made salient in both attorney statements,
defendants were given shorter sentences (M = 8.67, SD = 9.79) compared to when race was not
made salient (M = 14.06, SD = 10.50; contrast = -6.64, p = .002); sentence recommendations
were also significantly shorter for defendants when race was salient in opening statements only
(M = 12.30, SD = 10.47) compared to when race was not salient (contrast = -6.52, p = .01). All
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other comparisons across the race salience variable were nonsignificant, including all
comparisons with the closing arguments only condition (M = 13.27, SD = 11.50). In addition, the
interaction term in the overall ANCOVA was also not significant, F(3,116) = .95, ns. Thus, postdeliberation sentencing recommendations reflected those found prior in some ways, but not
others, providing partial support for Hypotheses 5 and 6 of Experiment 1.
Results for post-deliberation defendant character ratings were identical to those found
before deliberation. For violence ratings, a main effect was found for defendant race (F[1,194] =
7.81, p = .006, p2 = .04), such that Black defendants were considered less violent (M = 4.35, SD
= 1.93) than White defendants (M = 5.65, SD = 1.81). There was no main effect of race salience
(F[3,194] = 1.26), and the interaction term was not significant (F[3,194] = 1.64, both ns). For
aggressiveness ratings, a main effect of defendant race was also found (F[1,194] = 13.75, p <
.001, p2 = .07), with Black defendants seen as less aggressive (M = 4.55, SD = 1.99) compared
to White defendants (M = 6.13, SD = 1.77). As with violence ratings, no evidence was found for
a main effect of race salience (F[3,194] = .59) or for an interaction effect (F[3,194] = .40, both
ns). Therefore, support was found for Hypotheses 5 and 6 in relation to defendant character
ratings.
To test Hypothesis 7 of Experiment 1, Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE;
Ballinger, 2004) were used with defendant race and race salience as between subjects predictors,
time (pre- vs. post-deliberation) as a within-subjects predictor, and verdict choice as the
dependent variable. The binary logistic model tested within GEE included all main effects and
two-way interactions; the three-way interaction between defendant race, race salience, and time
was not included as no hypotheses were made regarding this interaction. Support for Hypothesis
7 would be indicated through a significant two-way interaction between race salience and time
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(pre- vs. post-deliberation), such that participants in the Opening and Closing and Opening Only
conditions would show significant pre-post differences in verdict choice while participants in the
Closing Only and Not Salient conditions would show no differences before and after
deliberation.
Results indicated a significant main effect of defendant race (Wald’s 2[1] = 37.11, p <
.001); ignoring time of verdict, the Black defendant was more likely to be found not guilty
(56.6%) while the White defendant was overwhelmingly found guilty (78.7%). There was no
main effect of race salience (Wald’s 2[3] = 2.82) or time (Wald’s 2[1] = 1.66, both ns), and the
interactions between defendant race and race salience (Wald’s 2[3] = 3.10) and race salience
and time (Wald’s 2[3] = 2.66) were also nonsignificant. Therefore, Hypothesis 7, which states
that differences across time based on race salience condition would exist, was not supported.
In addition, an unexpected interaction between defendant race and time was identified
(Wald’s 2[1] = 12.16, p < .001). Results indicated that pre-deliberation verdict choice for the
Black defendant (51.5% not guilty) did not significantly differ from verdict choice following
deliberation (61.6% not guilty; ns). However, the White defendant was significantly more likely
to be found guilty following deliberation (85.2% guilty) than prior to deliberation (72.2% guilty;
p = .001). Thus, mock jurors were more likely to switch to guilty verdicts following jury
deliberation, but only if the defendant was White.
Post-Hoc Jury Analyses
In addition to the main analyses, post-hoc analyses were conducted on the jury-level
variables to explore data trends. Given the low number of juries (N = 46), no hypotheses were
made at the jury level and any trends identified should be interpreted with caution. First,
descriptive statistics were calculated for all jury-level variables. Then, juries were compared
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across conditions to examine preliminary effects of race salience at the group level. Next,
analyses were conducted to examine the role of pre-deliberation majority verdict in final jury
verdicts. Finally, foreperson characteristics were analyzed to explore how forepersons in this
experiment were similar to and different from the average participant.
In total, 46 juries were collected in Experiment 1. Across these juries, 23 (50.0%) reached
a unanimous guilty verdict, 14 (30.4%) reached a unanimous not guilty verdict, and 9 (19.6%)
could not reach a unanimous verdict. These final verdicts generally matched those of the predeliberation majority: 29 (63.0%) juries had a majority favoring guilty verdicts prior to
deliberation, 11 (24.0%) juries had not guilty majorities, and 6 (13.0%) juries were equally split
between guilty and not guilty at the pre-deliberation phase (average size of majority = 70.59%,
SD = 13.05%). Though juries were given up to 20 minutes to deliberate, most juries convened
for less than the allotted time (M = 7.75 minutes, SD = 5.37 minutes). In terms of gender, 30
(65.2%) of juries had a gender majority favoring women, 6 (13.0%) had a male majority, and 10
(21.7%) were equally split between men and women (average size of gender majority = 70.54%,
SD = 16.11%). Finally, juries ranged from 4 participants (30.4% of all juries) to 8 participants in
size (13.0% of all juries), with the most common size being a four-person jury. Importantly,
there were no significant differences in final verdict choice across jury size (2[8] = 9.30, ns),
and jury size was equal across condition (2[28] = 27.91, ns).
After calculating descriptive statistics, jury verdicts were analyzed to examine any
differences across conditions. Given the low number of juries per cell, the race salience variable
was condensed into two conditions: those where race was salient at any point (total N = 35
juries) and those where race was not salient at all (total N = 11). Then, two 2 analyses were
conducted, one for each level of the collapsed race salience variable, with defendant race and
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jury verdict included in the model. Results showed a significant relationship when race was
salient (2[2] = 7.81, p = .02), with the White defendant more likely to be found guilty (64.7%)
than the Black defendant (22.2%). The analysis was not significant when race was not salient
(2[1] = 3.44, ns); however, this result is likely due to the low N of this condition, as all five
juries voted guilty when the defendant was White, but only 50% of juries unanimously voted
guilty when the defendant was Black. In addition to these findings, it is worth noting that
although all juries had the option to not reach a consensus, hung juries only occurred when race
was salient (25.7% hung jury rate). All eleven juries where race was not salient chose to reach a
unanimous decision.
Next, the effects of pre-deliberation verdict preference were explored. Previous research
suggests that the majority verdict choice prior to deliberation typically matches the final jury
verdict (Sandys & Dillehay, 1995), and that the size of the majority determines how often jury
verdicts go against the pre-deliberation preference (Tindale et al., 1990). To investigate these
past findings in relation to the juries in this experiment, a 2 analysis was conducted on final jury
verdict and pre-deliberation majority juror verdict (ignoring juries with a 50% pre-deliberation
split). Results indicated a significant relationship (2[2] = 15.64, p < .001); juries who favored a
guilty verdict before deliberation overwhelmingly reached a guilty verdict (69.0%, residual = 2.00) and juries favoring a not guilty verdict overwhelmingly chose a unanimous not guilty
verdict (72.7%, residual = 2.50). In addition, descriptive statistics were calculated to compare
juries where the final verdict matched the majority and juries where the final verdict did not.
Results showed that juries that changed their verdict had a smaller pre-deliberation majority (M =
64.3%, SD = 9.8%) compared to juries that did not change (M = 71.9%, SD = 13.8%). An
independent samples t-test comparing these values was nonsignificant (t[35] = -1.18, ns);
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however, given the small size of the group that changed verdicts (N = 5), this test has low power.
Thus, overall, some support was found for the previous findings on pre-deliberation majorities
and their impact on final jury decisions (Sandys & Dillehay, 1995; Tindale et al., 1990).
Finally, foreperson characteristics were investigated to test for differences between
forepersons and the typical participant in Experiment 1. In general, foreperson gender reflected
that of the study overall: 56.8% of juries had a female foreperson compared to the gender
breakdown of all participants in Experiment 1 (66.7% women). When juries were equally split
between men and women, this trend was flipped, with men (60.0%) chosen as foreperson more
often than women. Next, one-sample t-tests were conducted comparing foreperson age, strength
of religious beliefs, political orientation, modern racism, and social dominance orientation to the
overall participant population of Experiment 1. Results indicated that foreperson age (M = 19.93,
SD = 2.11) did not significantly differ from other participants’ (M = 19.49, SD = 1.80; t[43] =
1.38, ns); that foreperson political orientation (M = 4.05, SD = 1.43) did not significantly differ
from other participants’ (M = 3.65, SD = 1.40; t[43] = 1.82, ns); that foreperson modern racism
(M = 2.29, SD = .59) did not significantly differ from other participants’ (M = 2.38, SD = .61;
t[43] = -.98, ns); and that foreperson social dominance orientation (M = 2.49, SD = .91) did not
significantly differ from other participants’ (M = 2.44, SD = .97; t[43] = .39, ns). A significant
difference was found between religious beliefs (t[43] = -3.24, p = .002), with forepersons
indicating a lower strength of religious beliefs (M = 3.80, SD = 1.97) compared to other
participants (M = 4.76, SD = 1.69).
Experiment 1 Discussion
Overall, the pre-deliberation findings of Experiment 1 suggest that when race is made
salient through attorney statements, the effect differs from that found through previous race
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salience manipulations. Specifically, for all continuous measures (guilt ratings, sentencing
recommendations, and defendant character ratings of violence and aggressiveness), the indicative
interaction between race salience and defendant race was not found. However, for predeliberation verdict preference, there was a race salience effect. When participants received a
manipulation in both attorney statements, or in closing arguments alone, they gave nonequivalent
verdicts for the White and Black defendant, but when participants received either a manipulation
in opening arguments only or received no manipulation at all, verdict preference was equivalent
across defendant race. Furthermore, in conditions where the White and Black defendant received
different verdicts, it was the White defendant who was more likely to be found guilty.
These results do not support Hypotheses 1-4 of Experiment 1 and are also incongruent
with past race salience research in two important ways. First, whereas the current study found an
inconsistent race salience effect, only manifesting through verdict preference, previous published
research has typically reported a consistent effect through multiple dependent variables and
stronger effects for continuous measures (Cohn et al., 2009; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001).
Indeed, the only nonsignificant result reported in any of these studies was a marginally
significant dichotomous verdict choice (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001).
More importantly, the race salience effect identified in the current study is distinct from
the effect found in most past research. The effect initially described by Sommers and Ellsworth
(2000) stated that when race was not salient, White jurors would display an anti-Black bias, and
that when race was salient, trial outcomes were equivalent across defendant race. However, in
the current study, trial outcomes were equivalent when race was not salient, and in two
conditions where race was salient, White jurors displayed an anti-White bias (outcomes were
equivalent in the third condition). This finding will be discussed in detail in the General
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Discussion section below, but it is an important distinction between Experiment 1 and past race
salience research.
In addition, Experiment 1 provided a more comprehensive examination of how the race
salience effect operates through attorney statements by testing the unique contributions of
opening statements and closing arguments on juror decisions. A critical limitation of Bucolo and
Cohn’s (2010) investigation of attorney statements was that race was made salient in both
statements or not at all, making it impossible to determine which statement was driving the
effect. In support of Bucolo and Cohn (2010), the effect was found when race was salient in both
attorney statements; importantly, the same pro-outgroup bias was identified in their research as
in the current study. Extending on their findings, race was also made salient in opening
statements or closing arguments only; in these conditions, a race salience effect was only
detected when the manipulation was included in closing arguments. In other words, the predeliberation findings of Experiment 1 suggest closing arguments to be the component of attorney
statements in which a race salience effect can be sufficiently implemented.
It was hypothesized that a race salience effect would only be found in conditions where
race was made salient in opening statements. These hypotheses were formed based on research
on the story model of juror decision making (Pennington & Hastie, 1986), cognitive schemas
(Bransford & Johnson, 1972), and research suggesting that jurors often reach a final decision
early in a trial (Diamond et al., 1996). In all three cases, the research suggests that adding a
manipulation early in the trial, rather than waiting until the end would be most effective. It was
expected that the race salience effect would follow this same pattern, being effective when
implemented at the start of the trial and relatively ineffective at the end of the trial.
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One possible explanation as to why the manipulation was more effective in closing
arguments is a combination of aversive racism and the recency effect. Aversive racism theory
states that most people do not perceive themselves to be racist while at the same time holding
implicit prejudices against racial outgroups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Furthermore, because
aversive racists do not want to appear racist to others, they take steps to avoid appearing
prejudiced by equalizing (or, in the case of the current study, overcorrecting) their behavior
toward racial outgroup members (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). However, they only take these
steps in situations where their behavior could be interpreted as overtly racist, such as when race
is made salient in a court case (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). Thus, in Experiment 1, mock
jurors should only display changed behavior when they felt their responses could be interpreted
as racially biased.
In cognitive psychology, the recency effect refers to the tendency for items presented at
the end of a list to be recalled with better accuracy and higher likelihood than items presented at
the beginning or especially in the middle of a list (Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi,
Haarmann, & Usher, 2005). The recency effect is a component of the broader serial position
effect (Murdock, 1962), which also accounts for the tendency for items at the beginning of a list
to be recalled with a higher probability than items in the middle (known as the primacy effect).
Furthermore, recency effects increase in strength as a function of the length of the list being
recalled (Murdock, 1962; Ward, 2002). Within Experiment 1, it could be construed that the “list”
being recalled was the trial transcript. Particularly in comparison to previous race salience
research (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), this was a very complex list of information. In the
study, mock jurors were asked to read or listen to pretrial judicial instructions, attorney opening
statements, witness statements for the defense and prosecution, visual exhibits, attorney closing
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statements, post-trial judicial instructions, sentencing instructions, and jury deliberation
instructions; altogether, these materials composed 24 pages of documents that participants were
asked to remember and consider when making a final decision. Therefore, it could be expected
that participants would rely on the recency effect when recalling information from the trial.
If mock jurors in Experiment 1 were relying on the recency effect, it would be no surprise
that only those in conditions where race was salient in closing arguments displayed a race
salience effect. Participants who were given a race salience manipulation in opening statements
alone went on to read or listen to another 14 pages worth of documents before responding to any
trial outcome measures. In addition, participants had already read 7 pages of documents prior to
reaching the opening statement manipulation. It is unlikely, then, that participants in the Opening
Only condition would be able to rely on either the primacy or the recency effect to recall the race
salience manipulation. Because the specifics of the manipulation were unlikely to be accurately
recalled, it is also unlikely that participants in this condition would be affected by aversive
racism: if the participant cannot remember that an attorney made race salient, then they will feel
no reason to alter their behavior. On the other hand, for participants in the two conditions where
race was made salient in closing arguments, only four pages remained of the transcript before
they responded to trial outcome measures. It is much more likely that these participants would
recall that race had been made salient to the case. Because they could accurately recall the race
salience manipulation, these participants would also be expected to change their behavior toward
the White or Black defendant in an effort to appear racially unbiased in a manner similar to that
in Experiment 1. To more concretely determine whether the recency effect was driving the
results found in the current study, future research should replicate Experiment 1 but also ask for
detailed free recall following the study.
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Experiment 1 also investigated the role of jury deliberations on the race salience effect
(Sommers, 2006). Overall, the effects identified pre-deliberation persisted after jury deliberation.
As indicated before deliberation, there was no evidence of a race salience effect for sentencing
recommendations or defendant character ratings of violence and aggressiveness. In other words,
for these three measures, it did not matter whether mock jurors were reviewing a case involving
a Black or a White defendant, and it did not matter whether race had been made salient in both of
the attorney statements, just one, or none at all. More importantly, post-deliberation sentencing
recommendations and character ratings remained equivalent across condition, suggesting that
jury deliberation played an unimportant role in these mock jurors’ decision making processes
and did not create any new race salience effects. Given the potential for group decision making
(Tindale et al., 1990) and jury deliberations in particular (Nunez et al., 2011) to influence
courtroom decision making, the current study marks an important step in establishing the
persistence, or lack thereof, of race salience effects following deliberation. This point will be
discussed in more detail in the General Discussion section below.
However, one critical difference in the continuous measures was noted from pre- to postdeliberation: the key interaction between defendant race and race salience was identified for guilt
ratings, denoting a race salience effect. Specifically, participants were more likely to find the
White defendant guilty when race was made salient in opening statements alone and when race
was not made salient at all; guilt ratings were equivalent when race was made salient in both
statements and in closing arguments alone. Thus, jury deliberation did play a role in guilt ratings,
leading participants in two of the race salience conditions to assign stronger guilt to the White
defendant.
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The nature of this particular race salience effect is puzzling for several reasons. First,
since equivalency was present in two of the salient conditions and a difference was found within
the non-salient condition, it is the only finding of Experiment 1 to generally reflect this expected
direction of effect based on past research (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). However, the form
of discrimination remained the same, such that White mock jurors displayed an anti-White bias
when race was not salient. Why would White participants display bias against their ingroup in a
situation where race is not made relevant at all? Even more perplexing is that the effect found for
post-deliberation guilt ratings directly contrasts that for pre-deliberation verdict choices, where a
pro-outgroup bias was found when race was salient in both statements and in closing arguments
only, but not the other conditions. The existence of two completely different race salience effects
within the same sample is intriguing.
Perhaps the best explanation for this post-deliberation “race salience effect” is the heavy
impact of defendant race across all conditions, particularly following deliberations. Across all
phases of Experiment 1, with the exception of pre-deliberation sentencing recommendations,
every outcome variable displayed a significant effect of defendant race, with the White defendant
always receiving harsher judgments than the Black defendant. In cases where more than one
effect was significant, the strongest relationship in the model was always defendant race.
Furthermore, effect sizes for all defendant race analyses were larger at the post-deliberation
phase, suggesting that jury deliberation may have exacerbated differences based on defendant
race. This suggestion is supported by the unexpected interaction found between defendant race
and time on verdict choice, where mock jurors were more likely to convict the White defendant,
but not the Black defendant, following deliberation compared to pre-deliberation. Thus, at every
point and for nearly every outcome, mock jurors gave more lenient trial outcomes to the Black
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defendant in comparison to the White defendant, and this preference was strongest following
deliberations.
The findings across defendant race help explain the odd race salience effect on postdeliberation guilt ratings because the findings suggest that guilt ratings may have served as a
justification for mock jurors changing their verdict preference following deliberation. At the predeliberation phase, a race salience effect was found for verdict choice; after deliberating, the
effect disappeared, as participants in all race salience conditions were more likely to convict the
White defendant than the Black defendant. Therefore, some participants in the conditions where
race was salient in opening statements only or where race was not salient at all must have
changed their verdict either by voting not guilty more often for the Black defendant or guilty
more often for the White defendant, or both. Participants may have felt the need to justify their
change in verdict, and they had the means to do so by altering their responses to other measures
at the post-deliberation stage. Thus, since post-deliberation analyses controlled for predeliberation responses, the “race salience effect” identified in post-deliberation guilt may simply
be the result of participants in the Closing Only and Not Salient conditions adjusting their guilt
ratings in tandem with their verdict preferences, and not an actual race salience effect where the
salience of race to the case differentially impacted trial outcomes.
Along with addressing the race salience literature, Experiment 1 also investigated
previous findings within jury deliberation and group decision making research in general. The
most important of these findings relate to the pre-deliberation majority and foreperson
characteristics. The influence of the pre-deliberation majority on final jury verdict is wellestablished in the literature (Sandys & Dillehay, 1995; Tindale et al., 1990) and was the primary
justification for the post-deliberation hypotheses of Experiment 1. In support of this justification,
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juries in the current study overwhelmingly reached a consensus verdict mirroring that of the predeliberation majority. These findings also lend credence to the strong influence of the predeliberation majority in a jury setting.
Experiment 1 also explored how the average foreperson was similar to and different from
the average mock juror. While past research suggests that forepersons are more likely to be men
(Devine et al., 2001) and older (Ellison & Munro, 2010), forepersons in the current study
reflected the average mock juror in both gender and age. However, over 96% of participants
were between the ages of 18 and 22, making any differences based on age difficult to detect. In
addition to age and gender, Experiment 1 also investigated foreperson characteristics that have
not been examined in the published literature. Compared to the average mock juror, forepersons
were equivalent in terms of their political orientation, modern racism, and social dominance
orientation. Forepersons did differ in the strength of their religious beliefs, with forepersons
having a lower strength compared to the average mock juror. Because of the post hoc nature of
the foreperson analyses, these results should be interpreted with caution. However, Experiment 1
extends the literature on foreperson characteristics and suggests new areas for research into the
role of the foreperson in the jury deliberation process.
There are several limitations unique to Experiment 1. First, there are issues related to
power that should be considered when interpreting these findings. Most importantly, the a priori
power analysis conducted for Experiment 1 recommended a sample size of at least 250 in order
to achieve adequate power. Although more than 250 participants were collected, data cleaning
necessitated the removal of over 50 participants, dropping the total sample size below that
recommended by the analysis. This issue was exacerbated for analyses involving sentencing
recommendations, as only those participants who chose a guilty verdict were included (N = 129,
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or about 16 participants per cell). However, it is worth noting that in most cases, the interaction
term was not close to significance, as most p-values exceeded .50. It is unlikely that these
nonsignificant interactions would have changed with more participants.
Related to the first limitation is the lack of homogeneity of variance in post-deliberation
guilt ratings. This is particularly concerning given that this was one of only two variables where
a race salience effect was found. The lack of homogeneity may have been due to the variability
in sample size across the eight conditions, as unequal sample sizes can cause Levene’s test to
become untrustworthy (Field, 2013). Of course, conducting an analysis of variance with unequal
sample sizes leads to further issues, particularly by lowering the power of the tests (Yuen, 1974).
However, given that the interaction was significant for post-deliberation guilt ratings, the
question of low power is irrelevant. Thus, results using the post-deliberation guilt measure
should be interpreted with caution, but so should the test of homogeneity of variance.
There are also three important limitations related to jury research that should be
considered. First, juries varied in size from four- to eight-person juries. The variability of jury
size may confound the results of jury deliberation, as past research indicates that the size of a
jury can influence final decisions and variability amongst jurors (Devine et al., 2001). However,
given that jury size did not vary as a function of condition, and that jury size was not related to
final verdict choice, jury size should only have a minimal effect, if any, in the current study.
Second, juries in Experiment 1 were not required to reach a consensus jury verdict even though
juries in actual criminal trials typically reach consensus (Devine et al., 2001). Some previous
research indicates that jurors may behave differently when they do not have to reach a consensus
(Kameda, 1991), although there is also evidence that jury decision rules have little effect on final
jury verdicts (Devine et al., 2001). Future research should investigate the effects of race salience
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following jury deliberation in which a consensus decision was required of the jury to empirically
examine the role that decision rules play in the race salience literature.
A final limitation of the jury design used in Experiment 1 is that no actual jury-level
analyses were conducted in order to test the hypotheses of the study. Rather, a pre-post design
was used, based on Miller et al. (2011), in which the effects of jury deliberation were implied by
comparing individual responses to trial outcomes before and after deliberation. This is not an
ideal method, as there are important differences in the decision making processes of individuals
and groups (Nunez et al., 2011), many of which have been investigated in the courtroom (e.g.,
Devine et al., 2001; Ellsworth, 1989; Kameda & Sugimori, 1993). As stated previously, the
approach used in Experiment 1 was chosen based on feasibility alone. However, jury-level
research is a critical step toward fully understanding the juror decision making process. The
current study should be seen as an intermediary step between simple juror analyses and full jury
analyses, and future research should build upon the findings of Experiment 1 by conducting a
jury-level investigation of the race salience effect within attorney statements.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants
As with Experiment 1, minimum sample size was determined for Experiment 2 with an a
priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9 (Faul et al., 2009). To identify medium effect sizes at
 = .05 and power = .80, G*Power recommended a sample size of at least 128 participants.
Experiment 2 consisted of 170 jury-eligible White students at the University of North
Dakota who participated in the study for credit toward completion of introductory-level
psychology courses. Of these, three were excluded from analyses for not being U.S. citizens,
seven were excluded from analyses for failing to respond to several items and ten were excluded
for failing both manipulation checks. Thus, analyses for Experiment 2 included 150 participants
(Mage = 19.75, SD = 2.50; 67.3% female; see Table 6 for full demographic information).
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (defendant race) x 2 (race salience) factorial design,
with 39 participants in the Black Defendant, Race Salient condition, 40 participants in the White
Defendant, Race Salient condition, 34 participants in the Black Defendant, Not Salient condition,
and 37 participants in the Black Defendant, Not Salient condition.
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Table 6
Participant Demographics, Experiment 2
Variable

Mean/Frequency (SD/%)

Age (18-45)

19.75 (2.50)

Sex (% Women)

101 (67.3%)

Strength of Religious Beliefs (1-7)

4.29 (1.93)

Political Orientation (1-7)

3.70 (1.45)

Served on a Jury? (% Yes)

2 (1.3%)

Been Victim of a Crime? (% Yes)

10 (6.7%)

Witnessed a Crime? (% Yes)

32 (21.3%)

Trial Simulation
The same basic trial transcript pilot tested and used with Experiment 1 (see Appendix A)
was employed in Experiment 2. In addition to this transcript, Experiment 2 also included two
pretrial publicity newspaper articles, one about the incident and one about the upcoming trial
(partly based on Vitagliano, Yan, & Sgueglia, 2016; and WFTV Orlando, 2016; see Appendix I).
As with Experiment 1, once the core transcript was validated, an additional pilot study
was conducted through MTurk (N = 75) in which the pretrial publicity materials were added to
ensure that their inclusion did not alter the balanced verdict preference of the core transcript.
Verdict preference remained balanced in this pilot study (48.6% guilty); in addition, verdict
confidence (M = 5.64, SD = 1.12) and guilt ratings (M = 4.26, SD = 1.89) remained at similar
levels to those found prior to adding the pretrial publicity materials.

72

Race Salience Manipulation
In Experiment 2, race was made salient through phrases included in the pretrial publicity
newspaper articles. For participants in the Race Salient conditions, the title of the incidentrelevant article included the term “interracial” in its description of the assault, and the defendant
and victim were given demographic descriptors highlighting their racial groups (e.g., Jamal will
be described as “an African-American male”). In the article about the upcoming trial, one
sentence was added in the Race Salient conditions: “If my client was [White/Black] and the
victim was [Black/White], rather than the other way around, we wouldn’t even be having this
discussion.” Participants in the Not Salient conditions read the same articles with these
statements omitted.
Measures and Procedure
In general, participants in Experiment 2 completed the same measures used and described
in Experiment 1 above. Important differences about the procedure for Experiment 2 are
described below.
Prior to arrival, each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions. As
mentioned previously, Experiment 1 and 2 were conducted concurrently, and any timeslots with
more than three participants were assigned to Experiment 1. Thus, each timeslot for Experiment
2 allowed a maximum of three participants at a time.
Prior to completing the study, all participants completed the MRS (Experiment2 = .83;
Appendix E) and SDO scales (Experiment2 = .91; Appendix F) through a prescreen offered through
UND’s Sona System website. After arriving, participants were seated at a computer desk where
they completed the majority of the experiment. The experimenter provided participants with a
statement of consent and basic instructions on completing the study and using the computer.
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Participants completed the study materials at their own pace. Participants first read two pretrial
publicity newspaper articles which served as the race salience manipulation (Appendix I). Then,
participants read all components of the basic trial transcript (Appendix A) and completed the
Juror Questionnaire (Appendix D) and the Post-Trial Questionnaire (Appendix G; see Table 7
for Experiment 2 descriptive statistics). Finally, participants were debriefed and given credit for
their participation.
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables and Covariates, Experiment 2
Variable

Experiment 2

Guilt (1-7)

4.18 (1.23)

Verdict Choice (% Guilty)

74 (49.3%)

Sentence Length (years)a

7.00 (6.44)

Defendant Violence (1-9)

4.70 (1.79)

Defendant Aggressiveness (1-9)

5.11 (1.80)

Defense Case Strength (1-7)

4.31 (1.27)

Prosecution Case Strength (1-7)

4.18 (1.15)

Racial Motivation (1-7)

3.01 (1.78)

Modern Racism (1-5)

2.46 (.58)

Social Dominance Orientation (1-7)
2.54 (1.00)
: Sentence Length responses are only included for participants who reached a guilty verdict.

a
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
As with Experiment 1, preliminary analyses were first conducted on the Experiment 2
data to ensure statistical assumptions, explore relationships between demographics and the DVs,
and demonstrate the effectiveness of the race salience manipulations.
Skewness and kurtosis values for all variables except sentencing recommendation were
less than +/- 1.96, indicating strong evidence for normally distributed data. In addition, all
variables meeting the normality assumption also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance
(Fguilt = 1.95; Fviolent = .13; Faggressive = 2.61; all ns). However, sentencing recommendations were
outside of the acceptable range for normality (as identified in Field, 2013; skewness = 2.20,
kurtosis = 6.33). To ensure normal distribution, a square root data transformation was performed
on sentencing recommendations. This transformation led to a variable within the acceptable
range for normality (skewness = .81, kurtosis = 1.05); the transformed variable also displayed
homogeneity of variance (F = .27, ns).
Analyses were also conducted to ensure that demographic characteristics were equivalent
across the four conditions. Results indicated that there were no significant differences across
condition based on gender (2[3] = 2.67), age (F[3,146] = 1.74), strength of religious beliefs
(F[3,146] = .53), or political orientation (F[3,146] = .81; all ns).
Next relationships between demographic characteristics and the dependent variables were
investigated. No significant relationships were identified between the DVs and gender (2verdict
[1] = 1.22; tguilt [148] = -.68; tsentence [148] = -.05; tviolent [148] = -1.00, taggressive [148] = -1.68; all
ns), age (guilt = -.01; sentence = -.07; violent = .03; aggressive = .04; all ns), strength of religious
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beliefs (guilt = .06; sentence = .08; violent = .08; aggressive = .13; all ns), or political orientation
(guilt = -.04; sentence = -.03; violent = .09; aggressive = .05; all ns).
Correlations were then calculated between the covariates and the dependent variables to
identify any issues with multicollinearity. Results indicated that all correlations were at
acceptable levels (highest r = .50; see Table 8 for all correlations).
Finally, a 2 analysis was conducted to ensure that the race salience manipulation was
noticed by participants in the race salience conditions. Results indicated that there was a
relationship between which race salience condition a participant was in and their ability to recall
pretrial publicity statements about race (2[1] = 22.31, p < .001), with 40% of participants in the
Race Salience conditions recalling statements about race compared to 5.6% of participants in the
Not Salient conditions.
Main Analyses
To examine the hypotheses of Experiment 2, four 2 x 2 ANCOVAs were conducted with
defendant race (White vs. Black) and race salience (Salient vs. Not Salient) entered as IVs; mean
scores on modern racism and social dominance orientation and ratings of case strength for the
defense and prosecution entered as covariates; and the four continuous dependent variables (guilt
ratings, sentence length, defendant violent character rating, and defendant aggressiveness
character rating) entered as DVs in separate analyses. As with Experiment 1, an interaction effect
between the two IVs would indicate a race salience effect; specifically, it was expected that
participants would give harsher ratings to Black compared to White defendants when race was
not salient (Hypothesis 1) and that participants would give equalized ratings across defendant
race when race was salient (Hypothesis 2).
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Table 8
Correlations Among Covariates and Dependent Variables, Experiment 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Guilt

---

2. Sentence
Length

.14

---

3. Verdict

.62**

N/Aa

---

4. Defendant
Violence

.54**

.17

.47**

---

5. Defendant
Aggression

.53**

.23*

.42**

.81**

---

-.16

-.05

-.22**

-.09

-.07

---

7. Case of
Prosecution

.47**

.19

.50**

.39**

.36**

-.12

---

8. Modern
Racism

.12

-.14

.08

-.17*

-.18*

.06

.03

6. Case of
Defense

8

9

---

9. Social
.02
-.11
.05
-.06
-.11
.02
-.03
.44**
Dominance
Orientation
Note: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; a = Only guilty responses were used for sentence
recommendation analyses, so no correlation can be calculated.

---

For the continuous guilt measure, a main effect of defendant race was identified, F(1,142)
= 4.75, p = .03, p2 = .03, such that Black defendants (M = 3.95, SD = 1.18) were considered less
guilty than White defendants (M = 4.40, SD = 1.25). There was no main effect of race salience,
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F(1,142) = 2.29, ns; the interaction between the IVs was also not significant, F(1,142) = .06, ns.
Thus, the hypothesis regarding guilt ratings was not supported.
As with Experiment 1, analyses using sentencing recommendations were conducted only
on participants who chose a guilty verdict (N = 74). There was no main effect of defendant race,
F(1,66) = .88; no main effect of race salience, F(1,66) = .01; and no interaction effect, F(1,66) =
.20 (all ns). Therefore, neither of the hypotheses for Experiment 2 were supported in relation to
sentence length.
For ratings of the defendant’s character as violent, a main effect of defendant race was
identified, F(1,142) = 4.90, p = .03, p2 = .03. Overall, Black defendants were rated as less
violent (M = 4.36, SD = 1.70) compared to White defendants (M = 5.03, SD = 1.81). In addition,
there was a main effect of race salience with marginal significance, F(1,142) = 3.56, p = .06, p2
= .02; defendants were rated as less violent when race was not salient (M = 4.48, SD = 1.76)
compared to when race was salient (M = 4.90, SD = 1.80). However, there was no interaction
effect in support of the hypotheses, F(1,142) = .00, ns.
Results for defendant aggressiveness character ratings echoed those for defendant
violence. There was a main effect of defendant race, F(1,142) = 5.98, p = .02, p2 = .04; Black
defendants were rated as less aggressive overall (M = 4.73, SD = 1.77) compared to White
defendants (M = 5.47, SD = 1.75). There was also a marginal main effect of race salience,
F(1,142) = 3.43, p = .07, p2 = .02; defendants in cases where race was not salient were
considered less aggressive (M = 4.89, SD = 1.83) than defendants in cases where race was salient
(M = 5.30, SD = 1.75). Again, there was no interaction effect, F(1,142) = .21, ns, meaning that
the overall hypotheses for Experiment 2 were not supported.
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To test the hypotheses in Experiment 2 involving dichotomous DVs, two 2 analyses
were conducted, one for each level of the race salience variable, with defendant race (White vs.
Black) and dichotomous verdict choice (Guilty vs. Not Guilty) included in the analysis. I
expected to find a significant 2 when race was not salient with evidence that Black defendants
were more likely to be found guilty than not guilty (in support of Hypothesis 1) and a
nonsignificant 2 when race was salient (in support of Hypothesis 2).
Similar to Experiment 1, the 2 results revealed an unexpected race salience effect. When
race was not salient, defendant race had no relationship with verdict choice, 2(1) = .51, ns.
However, when race was salient, defendant race and verdict choice shared a relationship, 2(1) =
6.72, p = .01, Cramer’s V = .21. Also as in Experiment 1, the significant relationship was
opposite to that found by Sommers and Ellsworth (2000), among others, with White defendants
more likely to be found guilty than not guilty, and at nearly the same rate, Black defendants more
likely to be found not guilty than guilty (see Table 9).
Table 9
Verdict Choice across Defendant Race when Race is Salient, Experiment 2
Condition

Black Defendant

White Defendant

Guilty

16 (41%)

28 (70%)

Not Guilty

23 (59%)

12 (30%)

Total

39 (100%)

40 (100%)

Because race salience led to unbalanced verdict choices for both Black and White
defendants, either condition (Black vs. White defendant) could be driving the significant
relationship identified by the 2 analysis. In other words, in comparison to when race was not
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salient, making race salient may have caused participants to be less likely to convict Black
defendants, more likely to convict White defendants, or both. To explore which of these options
was driving the effect, a follow-up pair of 2 analyses were conducted, one for each level of
defendant race, with race salience and verdict choice as the included variables. Results indicated
that participants were equally likely to convict a Black defendant whether or not race was salient,
2(1) = .06, ns. However, when the defendant was White, participants were more likely to
convict him when race was salient than when it was not, 2(1) = 4.58, p = .03. Therefore, the
data suggest that the initial 2 results were driven by responses to the White defendant, not the
Black defendant, and that White defendants are more likely than Black defendants to be found
guilty when race is salient. Thus, the results of the 2 analyses contradict the predictions of this
study as well as those found in previous investigations of the race salience effect (e.g., Sommers
& Ellsworth, 2000; 2001; Cohn et al., 2009).
Experiment 2 Discussion
As with attorney statements in Experiment 1, the findings of Experiment 2 provide
limited support of a race salience effect when induced through pretrial publicity, although the
effect was not in the predicted direction. Across all four continuous trial outcome measures, the
expected interaction denoting a race salience effect failed to materialize. In contrast, responses to
the dichotomous verdict choice did reveal an effect. When race was salient in pretrial publicity,
participants were more likely to convict the White defendant compared to the Black defendant,
but when race was not salient, participants convicted the defendant equally across race.
Experiment 2 serves as the first investigation of the race salience effect in pretrial
publicity. It was predicted that pretrial publicity would successfully create a race salience effect
based on the persistence of other pretrial publicity effects through a trial (Steblay et al., 1999)
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and the suggestive findings of Fein et al. (1997) in which a Black defendant’s race was
highlighted or ignored within pretrial publicity. As expected, the salience of race to the case led
to differential treatment for the Black and White defendant when participants made their final
verdict choice. Therefore, on the surface, Experiment 2 provides evidence that race salience can
effectively alter trial outcomes when induced through pretrial publicity. Given the pervasiveness
of pretrial publicity in contemporary society (Steblay et al., 1999), the current study serves as an
important extension of the race salience literature.
This finding is qualified in two important ways. First, rather than eliminating the ingroup
favoritism displayed when race was not salient, it was making race salient that led to imbalanced
verdicts in the current study by fostering outgroup favoritism. Although still a race salience
effect, it is in contrast to that found in most previous research (e.g., Cohn et al., 2009; Sommers
& Ellsworth, 2000) as well as the predictions of Experiment 2. However, these findings are
congruent with more recent race salience research, such as the findings of Experiment 1 and
those of Bucolo and Cohn (2010). Still, because the effect found in Experiment 2 differs sharply
from the original effect, combining the results of the current study with past race salience
research must be done cautiously and with awareness that the effects are not identical.
Second, no race salience effects were found for any of the four continuous trial outcome
measures. Although similar to the results found in Experiment 1, these findings stand in contrast
to what is typically found in the race salience literature, where the effect is usually strongest
within continuous measures such as guilt and character ratings and weakest within categorical
verdict choices (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). This is particularly surprising given the
strong correlations between verdict choice and the other dependent variables. A statistical
explanation for this may be that, given the small effect size identified for verdict choice, power
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for the continuous measure analyses was too low to detect group differences. An a priori power
analysis for the ANOVAs in Experiment 2, specifically targeting effects of the size found for
verdict choice in the current study, indicated that a sample size of 259 would be necessary to
adequately test the hypotheses. Using the same parameters with 2, a sample size of 178 is
necessary. As Experiment 2 included only 150 participants, it is possible that the interaction
effects found for verdict choice are also found within the continuous trial outcome measures, but
the current study was not powerful enough to detect those effects. Given the relatively small
effect size found in this study and in most recent race salience literature (Bucolo & Cohn, 2010;
Cohn et al., 2009), future researchers should consider conducting a priori power analyses with
the ability to detect small effects, particularly when using a manipulation such as pretrial
publicity.
The current study also highlights the potential power held by those within news media.
Of course, those in the media should not be attempting to influence the outcome of a trial in
either direction, regardless of whether race is salient to the case. Even so, these findings suggest
that the newspaper columnist, TV personality, and political commentator can influence the
outcome of an interracial trial simply by pointing out the relevance of race to the case,
particularly when the defendant is White. In instances where a racial component is actually
present, those in news media can play a positive role in ensuring that the role of race and racism
in a criminal case is not ignored, even if those within the trial ignore it completely.
On the other hand, those in the media have the potential to exploit their position of
power. For instance, pretrial publicity can easily inject racially charged undertones into cases
where race is not actually relevant to a case. By injecting race into a case where it does not
belong, news media can potentially bias jurors toward guilty verdicts, even if race is never
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mentioned in the actual case. For example, if read by itself, the trial transcript of the current
study does not appear race-based; in fact, several pilot studies were conducted with the intent of
creating a balanced, unbiased transcript. However, once the racially charged pretrial publicity
materials were included, mock jurors incorporated it into their decision making processes and a
race salience effect was found. Conversely, news media can also alter trial outcomes by
purposefully ignoring the role of race in a case with a White defendant. In this manner, the media
can swing jurors away from guilty verdicts by intentionally avoiding the defendant’s racial
biases and motives. In response to this power, and their collective potential to exploit it to
influence criminal trials, those in the media should be cognizant when invoking racial aspects in
a pretrial publicity piece. Writers should ask themselves why they are reporting the crime in a
racial manner, and editors should consider the intentions and potential biases of their writers.
In the courtroom, judges and lawyers can take steps to try alleviating any influence that
racially charged pretrial publicity may have had on jurors, particularly when the defendant is
White. Judges should take into account the amount and intensity of race salient publicity when
considering a change of venue; they should also consider making a specific point of instructing
jurors to disregard racially charged publicity in cases where that publicity is factually inaccurate.
For their part, when the publicity is particularly invasive, lawyers may make a point to counter
the race-based publicity within their statements, or through the use of character witnesses. None
of these steps were taken within the current study to explore whether a challenge to race salience
would alter or undo the effects of a race salience manipulation, but future research would do well
to investigate this interaction to see what effects a race salience challenge might have on jurors’
verdict choice.
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As with Experiment 1, there were limitations unique to Experiment 2. First, unlike in
Experiment 1, mock jurors in Experiment 2 never convened as a jury or deliberated the case with
others. The lack of jury-level data is a pervasive limitation of courtroom decision making
research in general (Nunez et al., 2011), and jury research is critically absent within the race
salience literature specifically. By investigating only the individual, the current study ignores the
plethora of potential effects that jury deliberation may add to the decision making process, such
as social loafing (Latane et al., 1979), groupthink (Mullen et al., 1994), and in some cases, higher
attention to case details (Nunez et al., 2011). It is undeniable that the ideal experiment would
reflect the jury scenario present in actual criminal trials. However, with the number of juries
necessary to ensure adequate power, and the amount of time it takes to collect all of these juries,
jury research is heavy in resource requirements. As an alternative, Wiener, Krauss, and
Lieberman (2011) recommend conducting initial courtroom research using more basic paradigms
and only moving to intensive jury research once the initial findings suggest it is worth the effort.
In that vein, the current study serves as an important first step in identifying the effects of race
salience within pretrial publicity. Future research should build upon these initial findings and,
only after consistent patterns and effects have been established, eventually culminate with a
community sample jury study.
A second limitation of Experiment 2 is that the race salience manipulations used within
the pretrial publicity materials were partly quotes made by the defense attorney. In other words,
the manipulations used in Experiments 1 and 2 overlap in some ways. Because of this, some of
the similar effects noted across the two experiments may be due to this overlap. However, it is
worth noting that the effective race salience manipulations from Experiment 1 always involved a
manipulation placed within closing arguments, suggesting that an early race salience
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manipulation was not effective in that case. In contrast, the race salience manipulation in
Experiment 2 was presented at the very beginning of the study, prior to any actual materials from
the trial. In other words, the similar effects between the two experiments are for the closing
arguments of Experiment 1, presented at the end of the trial, and the pretrial publicity of
Experiment 2, presented before the trial materials. Because of this, the recency effects that seem
to explain the findings of Experiment 1 are not applicable to Experiment 2. Rather, the effects in
this study are more likely due to the particularly pervasive nature of pretrial publicity; the
capacity for pretrial publicity to affect trial outcomes has been established both empirically
(Steblay et al., 1999; Studebaker & Penrod, 1997) and in actual court cases (e.g., Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 1966).
Thus, the manipulations across the two experiments appear to be distinct and should not
be interpreted as identical effects. Even so, future research may wish to investigate race salience
within pretrial publicity using manipulations other than attorney quotes. For example, articles
could highlight statements quoted from a video recording of the incident, or previous comments
posted on social media, or statements made by civil organizations (such as ACLU or NAACP) in
regards to the case.
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of this dissertation was to explore whether previous research on the race
salience effect could be generalized in an effort to better understand the effect’s applicability to
real world trials. This investigation was conducted in two ways. First, given the lack of
manipulations examined in the past, the current studies sought to test two new methodologies of
making race salient: attorney statements (Experiment 1) and pretrial publicity (Experiment 2).
Although attorney statements had been investigated in one past study (Bucolo & Cohn, 2010),
Experiment 1 marked the first attempt at understanding the unique impact of each statement in
isolation. Second, given the lack of jury-level research on the race salience effect, and the
importance of this type of research to any courtroom phenomenon (Nunez et al., 2011),
Experiment 1 investigated the role of jury deliberation on a race salience effect implemented
through attorney statements.
A Generalized Race Salience Effect
With respect to the first goal, the current studies indicate mixed support for a broad race
salience effect. In both experiments, a race salience effect was identified within mock jurors’
final verdict choice. Experiment 1 found this effect when race was made salient in both attorney
statements and when race was salient in closing arguments alone, but no effect was identified
when the manipulation was implemented through opening statements alone. Given the length of
the trial used in the current studies, mock jurors in Experiment 1 potentially relied on recency
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effects when choosing a verdict (Murdock, 1962), which would explain why the manipulation
was only effective within closing arguments. Experiment 2 found support for a race salience
effect in pretrial publicity, a medium known to have persistent effects on juror decision making
in other realms (Steblay et al., 1999). Both of these studies expand the known limits of the race
salience effect by identifying common aspects of a criminal trial where a manipulation can be
effectively implemented.
On the other hand, no race salience effect was found for sentencing recommendations,
guilt ratings, or ratings of aspects of the defendant’s character, each of which have found a race
salience effect in past research (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001). Thus, the current studies
can only claim partial support for a broader race salience effect. However, there are several
explanations as to why the current studies failed to find evidence of the race salience effect for
the continuous measures. First, given the small effect sizes identified for verdict preference, the
current studies may not have had enough statistical power to detect an interaction within the
continuous variables. Using the average effect size across all significant race salience effects, a
sample size of 547 for Experiment 1 and 393 for Experiment 2 would have been necessary to
ensure adequate power for the continuous analyses, according to G*Power (Faul et al., 2009).
A second explanation for these null results may be that interaction effects were difficult
to identify due to the overwhelming role that defendant race played in the current studies. Across
both experiments, in all race salience conditions, and for nearly every trial outcome, the White
defendant received harsher judgments compared to the Black defendant. In each case, the effect
of defendant race was stronger than any other relationship in the model. Thus, some potential
race salience effects may have been overshadowed by mock jurors’ general tendency to display
outgroup favoritism in Experiment 1.
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Evidence for a Changing Race Salience Effect
Related to the bias against the White defendant is that although a race salience effect was
achieved in both of the current studies, it was markedly different from how the effect is
traditionally defined. According to Sommers and Ellsworth (2000), the race salience effect refers
to a bias against Black defendants that is quelled when race is made salient to the case. This
definition was supported by their research and several subsequent studies (Cohn et al., 2009;
Sommers & Ellsworth, 2001). However, the effect found in the current studies was that reported
by Bucolo and Cohn (2010), in which equal outcomes for Black and White defendants are
unbalanced when race is made salient, and the imbalance identified is a bias against White
defendants.
In some ways, these two effects are similar. After all, the direction of the effect is the
same, with ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation decreasing. The racial target driving the
effect is also the same; as in Sommers and Ellsworth’s (2000) initial study, the race salience
effects identified in the current studies were primarily caused by more negative outcomes for the
White defendant, not by more positive outcomes for the Black defendant. If this is the case, then
the current studies provide evidence (along with Bucolo & Cohn, 2010) that the same race
salience effect found in the literature can be created through attorney statements and through
pretrial publicity.
Furthermore, if the nature of the effect remains the same, the current studies suggest that
the initial starting point for White defendants has shifted to be equivalent to that of Black
defendants in an interracial crime, and that because White defendants receive equal treatment
without a race salience manipulation, the effect now creates an anti-White bias. The aversive
racism literature supports this interpretation, as research indicates outgroup favoritism under
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racially salient conditions (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000); some researchers have even
suggested that showing leniency toward outgroup defendants (compared to ingroup defendants)
allows mock jurors a chance to prove to others that they are not prejudiced (Braun & Gollwitzer,
2012). More generally, self-reported explicitly racist attitudes have steadily declined, even since
the initial race salience studies were conducted (see, e.g., Drakulich, 2015; Durrheim, Greener, &
Whitehead, 2015; Smith, Marsden, Hout, & Kim, 1972-2014). In contemporary society, mock
jurors may be more likely than ever to believe themselves to be nonracist and to be motivated to
avoid any situations or actions that would indicate any form of racism. Thus, it is possible that
the simple fact of an interracial crime is enough to make race salient to mock jurors, activating
the processes underlying aversive racism and equalizing trial outcomes across defendant race. By
further highlighting the racial nature of the crime, race saliency exacerbates the effect, causing
White jurors to display outgroup favoritism.
One alternative explanation for the race salience effects identified in the current studies is
that the subjective nature of attorney statements and pretrial publicity led mock jurors to distrust
a racially motivated anti-White crime. In the current studies, no actual evidence was presented to
indicate that anyone involved in the case was motivated by race; rather, it was either the defense
attorney (Experiment 1) or a newspaper article (Experiment 2) who did so. In the real world,
both of these actors play a role in which subjectivity and opinion plays a significant part.
Defense attorneys are motivated to help their clients and news sources are motivated by the need
for readers; in both instances, making race salient may be beneficial to their goals, even if race is
not actually relevant to the case. Furthermore, research indicates that the public harbors distrust
for both news media (Swift, 2016) and lawyers (Fiske & Dupree, 2014). Given these
considerations as well as the relatively low number of racially charged crimes committed against
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White individuals (FBI, 2016a), mock jurors in the current studies may not have believed the
race salience manipulations when the defendant was Black, causing the manipulation to only
increase negative outcomes in the more believable case involving a White defendant.
Regardless of which explanation best fits the data, the current studies suggest that the
race salience effect has changed, either in general or specifically when implemented through
attorney statements and pretrial publicity. To better understand this changing effect, future
research should replicate the initial studies on the race salience effect in which the manipulation
occurred through eyewitness statements (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001). If the same
outgroup favoritism effect is identified, this would provide evidence that the race salience effect
in general has shifted along with the public’s overt racism. On the other hand, if the initial
findings persist, then the current studies suggest that manipulations of race salience through
attorney statements and pretrial publicity lead to an effect that is unique from that found in other
situations.
Jury Deliberation and the Race Salience Effect
The second goal of this dissertation was to explore whether any race salience effects
identified in Experiment 1 persisted following jury deliberation. Unfortunately, the predeliberation phase of Experiment 1 identified only one race salience effect within mock jurors’
verdict choice. No other outcome variables displayed the interaction effect indicative of a true
race salience effect. Therefore, instead of several variables through which to test the effects of
jury deliberation, only verdict choice could be used to test the original post-deliberation
hypotheses. For this outcome, the race salience effect identified before deliberation was negated
following deliberation; the White and Black defendant were treated similarly regardless of
whether mock jurors received a manipulation in opening statements, closing arguments, both, or
90

neither. In other words, once mock jurors were given the chance to discuss the trial amongst
themselves, race salience’s role in the decision making process was overruled by other, more
important factors to the case.
By a large margin, Experiment 1 suggests that the most important factor for mock jurors
following deliberation was the race of the defendant. At the post-deliberation phase, mock jurors
believed that, compared to the Black defendant, the White defendant was guiltier, more violent,
and more aggressive, and that the White defendant should be convicted at a higher rate and given
a longer sentence than the Black defendant. Although defendant race was a strong predictor prior
to deliberation (as well as in Experiment 2), the deliberative process seems to have exacerbated
its impact, as the relationships between every variable and defendant race were stronger
following deliberation than they had been prior. Even more telling is that for verdict choice, the
only significant interaction was between defendant race and time. Compared to pre-deliberation
rates, the White defendant was more likely to be found guilty following deliberation. On the
other hand, the Black defendant was convicted as the same rate before and after deliberation.
This is an interesting finding, given that past research on the effects of jury deliberation
on trial outcomes based on defendant race typically find that White jurors display an ingroup
leniency bias (Lynch & Haney, 2009), particularly if the jury consists entirely of White jurors
(Bell & Lynch, 2015; Sommers, 2006). Furthermore, when assessing interracial crimes in
particular, Lynch and Haney (2009) found that juries were more likely to assign the death
penalty to Black defendants compared to White defendants. The divergence of Experiment 1
from previous research may be due to differences in the defendant’s perceived guilt. In the
Lynch and Haney (2009) study, for example, jurors specifically took part in the sentencing phase
of a case, meaning that the defendant had already been found guilty. In Experiment 1, jurors
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were not told whether the defendant was guilty; in fact, pilot studies were conducted with the
intent of ensuring that the defendant’s guilt was ambiguous. Building on this, perhaps the
combination of ambiguous guilt and an interracial crime was enough to create a race salience
effect that pervaded all conditions. When the defendant was Black, mock jurors may have feared
that reaching a guilty verdict would be construed as racist since the evidence did not clearly
indicate guilt. Conversely, when the defendant was White, mock jurors may have been afraid of
displaying ingroup favoritism and thus chose a guilty verdict to avoid appearing biased.
Regardless, the exacerbating role of deliberations on defendant race, along with the lack
of significant race salience effects at the pre-deliberation stage, make it difficult to draw
definitive conclusions about the persistence of race salience effects following jury deliberation.
More jury-level race salience research is needed to understand whether the trends identified in
the current studies are indicative of a larger trend for the race salience effect. This future research
should take the limitations of Experiment 1 into consideration in their designs by using a larger
sample size, by using more trial outcome measures, and by considering the large role played by
defendant race across condition.
Limitations and Future Directions
Several limitations of this dissertation apply to both experiments. First, the samples used
in the current studies were drawn from undergraduate psychology majors at the University of
North Dakota, a public university in the upper Midwest United States. Along with possible
limitations associated with demographic characteristics unique to this geographical area (see
Rentfrow et al., 2013), the more important issue is that the current studies used a college-aged
convenience sample rather than a community sample or an actual jury pool. Several researchers
have questioned the validity or accuracy of jury research when conducted using student samples
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(Diamond, 1997; Wiener et al., 2011), and some previous research has identified sample
differences. For example, Mitchell et al. (2005) noted that sample type moderated sentencing
across race, such that community samples displayed racial ingroup favoritism at a higher rate
than student samples. Given the effects under investigation in the current studies, Mitchell et
al.’s (2005) findings are particularly relevant, and the differences between student samples and
community samples should be considered when interpreting the results of this dissertation.
However, other researchers have noted inconsistent or null effects of sample type in jury
research (Nunez et al., 2011). For example, in two meta-analyses conducted nearly 20 years apart
(Bornstein, 1999; Bornstein et al., 2017), Bornstein and his colleagues have found few
differences across samples for a wide variety of trial outcomes, including guilt ratings, verdicts,
and sentencing recommendations. Thus, the use of student samples in the current studies is not
cause to dismiss the findings as irrelevant to real world jurors or juries.
A second limitation of this dissertation is the type of crime used in the trial simulation.
Past research has established that the decision making process for jurors and juries varies as a
function of the type of crime being considered. For example, crime severity, crime target
(property vs. person), and type of crime (blue collar vs. white collar) have all been shown to
influence the decision making process (Leiber & Fox, 2005; Walker & Woody, 2011).
Furthermore, crime type and defendant race are known to interact, with Black defendants
receiving harsher punishment for blue collar (Dixon, Mahoney, & Cocks, 2002) and violent
crimes, and White defendants receiving harsher punishment for financial and white collar crimes
(Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). This issue is particularly concerning for the race salience
literature, as all published research (and this dissertation) has investigated the effect in the
context of a violent crime (physical assault: Bucolo & Cohn, 2010, Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000,
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2001, Thomas & Balmer, 2007; homicide: Cohn et al., 2009; sexual assault: Sommers, 2006). To
further establish the existence of a general race salience effect, future research should expand
beyond violent crimes and use trial simulations with other common crimes, such as larceny,
grand theft auto (FBI, 2016b), fraud, and embezzlement (Barnett, n.d.).
A final limitation is that the manipulations and trial transcript used in the current study
were created specifically for this dissertation and, therefore, differ significantly from materials
used in previous investigations of race salience. New materials were created based on the lack of
race salience materials specifically created for pretrial publicity or attorney statements and based
on personal communication with Samuel Sommers (February 27, 2015), in which he stated that
recent projects utilizing his original materials were finding null effects. Because the materials
used in this dissertation diverge from those used in the past, some differences in effects may be
due to the materials themselves. However, there are also advantages to these new materials. For
instance, as opposed to most race salience manipulations (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000;
2001), the trial transcript of this study was lengthy and, for the most part, unrelated to the race
salience manipulation. By structuring the transcript in this manner, the current studies are a more
accurate representation of real court cases. In an actual case, a race salience effect would not
likely be the focal point of the case; instead, it may be mentioned in passing, or only in relation
to one piece of evidence, while the rest of the trial highlights other parts of the case. The trial
transcript created for this dissertation mirrors those considerations, with just two of the 24
transcript pages mentioning the salience of race at all. For future researchers, this transcript
should also prove beneficial. The transcript was pilot tested several times to ensure that the
defendant’s guilt was ambiguous before the addition of any race salience manipulations.

94

Therefore, future researchers can take this transcript and use it to test other manipulations with
some assurance that any deviations from ambiguous guilt are due to the manipulation.
Conclusion
This dissertation fills gaps in the race salience literature by exploring new manipulations
of the effect and examining the persistence of the effect following jury deliberation. By
identifying a race salience effect in closing arguments and in pretrial publicity, the current
studies suggest that race salience has broad application to courtroom settings and juror decision
making. Furthermore, the failure to find post-deliberation race salience effects in Experiment 1
provides some evidence that the deliberative process does not create new effects and may undo
effects that existed before deliberation. The current studies also uncovered several unexpected
findings. For example, both of the current studies found a race salience effect different than that
found in the majority of previous research. The outgroup favoritism effects identified in this
dissertation (and by Bucolo & Cohn, 2010) suggest that the dynamics of the race salience effect
may be changing along with self-reported public racial attitudes. Finally, mock jurors in the
current studies had strong reactions to defendant race in isolation from race salience, indicating
that a race salience effect may be created simply through the crime being interracial in nature.
Future research should continue to explore the race salience effect in order to further establish
the generalizability of the effect and better understand the direction and structure of the effect
itself.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Core Trial Transcript
Note: Elements of the materials that differ across Defendant Race condition are noted in
brackets.
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT COURT
Trial No. 83-0992
Plaintiffs:
[SCOTT WILSON/JAMAL HOWARD]: [23/25] year-old [White/Black] male,
[5’11”/6’1”], [190 lbs./185 lbs.], student
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
vs.
Defendant:
[JAMAL HOWARD/SCOTT WILSON]: [25/23] year-old [Black/White] male,
[6’1”/5’11”], [185 lbs./190 lbs.], student
____________________________________/
PRETRIAL ORDER
1. The defendant is charged with the crime of Assault with a Deadly Weapon. That crime
is defined as the intentional use of force against another person committed with an object used in
a way likely to cause death or serious bodily harm.
2. The defense of Self-Defense provides that: A person may use as much force against
another person as he or she reasonably believes is necessary to prevent the immediate use of
unlawful force against himself.
3. The prosecution has the burden of proof on both of the above issues. The defendant
should not be convicted unless there is evidence which proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime charged. If there is any evidence that the defendant was
acting in self-defense, he should not be convicted unless the prosecution proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense as defined in paragraph 2.
Dated: _____________________
___________________________
SAMUEL HARRIS, Circuit Judge
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PRETRIAL INSTRUCTIONS BY JUDGE HARRIS
Ladies and gentlemen, I will take a few moments now to give you some initial
instructions about this case and about your duties as jurors. At the end of the trial, I will give you
further instructions. Unless I specifically tell you otherwise, all such instructions – both those I
give you now and those I give you later – are equally binding on you and must be followed.
This is a criminal case, brought against the defendant by the State of Minnesota. The
defendant is charged with assault with a deadly weapon. It will be your duty to decide from the
evidence whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime charged. From the evidence,
you will decide what the facts are. You are entitled to consider that evidence in the light of your
own observations and experiences in the affairs of life. You may use reason and common sense
to draw deductions or conclusions from facts which have been established by the evidence. You
will then apply those facts to the law which I give you in these and in my other instructions, and
in that way reach your verdict. You are the sole judges of the facts, but you must follow my
instructions, whether you agree with them or not. You have taken an oath to do so.
Do not allow sympathy or prejudice to influence you. The law demands of you a just
verdict, unaffected by anything except the evidence, your common sense, and the law as I give it
to you.
Finally, please remember that only this defendant, not anyone else, is on trial here, and
that this defendant is on trial only for the crime charged, not for anything else.
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE (GIVEN BY JUDGE HARRIS)
In order to help you follow the evidence, I will now give you a brief summary of the
elements of the crime charged, which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to
make its case:
One, the defendant did an act with a deadly weapon that by its nature would directly and
probably result in the application of force to a person;
Two, the defendant did that act willingly;
Three, when the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable
person to realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in the application of
force to someone;
Four, when the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force with a deadly
weapon to a person; and
Five, the defendant did not act in self-defense.
At the end of the trial, I will give you a final instruction on these matters. If there is any
difference between what I just told you, and what I tell you in the instructions I give you at the
end of the trial, the instructions given at the end of the trial must govern you.
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FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED BY THE COURT
Reasonable Doubt
Reasonable doubt is doubt based upon reason and common sense, and not doubt based on
speculation. A reasonable doubt may arise from careful and impartial consideration of all the
evidence, or from a lack of evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a
convincing character that a reasonable person, after careful consideration, would not hesitate to
rely and act upon that proof in life’s most important decisions. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt.
Evidence
Evidence includes the statements of witnesses, documents and other things received as
exhibits, and any facts that have been stipulated – that is, facts formally agreed to by both parties.
Certain things are not evidence. I will list those things for you now:
1. Statements, arguments, questions, and comments by lawyers representing the parties in
the case are not evidence.
2. Objections are not evidence. Lawyers have a right to object when they believe
something is improper. You should not be influenced by the objection. If I sustain an
objection to a question, you must ignore the question and must not try to guess what
the answer might have been.
3. Testimony that I strike from the record, or tell you to disregard, is not evidence and
must not be considered.
4. Anything you see or hear about this case outside the courtroom is not evidence, unless
I specifically tell you otherwise during the trial.
Finally, some of you may have heard the terms “direct evidence” and “circumstantial
evidence.” You are instructed that you should not be concerned with those terms. The law makes
no distinction between them, and you should give all evidence the weight and value you believe
it is entitled to receive.
Deadly Weapon
A deadly weapon is defined as any object, instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly
or dangerous, or one that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause
death or great bodily harm.
Use of Self-Defense as Justification
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If a person reasonably believes that force is necessary to protect himself from what he
reasonably believes to be unlawful physical harm about to be inflicted by another and uses such
force, then he acted in self-defense.
Credibility of Witnesses
In deciding what the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and
what testimony you do not believe. You may believe all of what a witness said, or only part of it,
or none of it.
In deciding what testimony of any witness to believe, consider the witness’ intelligence,
the opportunity the witness had to have seen or heard the things testified about, the witness’
memory, any motives that witness may have for testifying a certain way, the general
reasonableness of the testimony, and the extent to which the testimony is consistent with other
evidence that you believe.
Note on Transcripts and Note Taking
At the end of the trial, you must make your decision based on what you recall of the
evidence. You will not have a written transcript to consult. You must pay close attention to the
testimony as it is given.
STATEMENT OF [SCOTT WILSON/JAMAL HOWARD] (PROSECUTION WITNESS)
I, [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard], state:
My name is [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard]. I’m a student at the University of Minnesota.
On June 4, at nearly 9:30 p.m., my date, Connie Cook, and I went to Melanie’s Bar in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. When we arrived, Connie and I sat at the bar. At the time, the seats
were unoccupied.
I bought two beers --- one for each of us --- and we began to drink. After a few sips, I
noticed [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] and Tanya Morgan several feet to my left. In an angry
voice, [Jamal/Scott] said, “Beat it! Go sit somewhere else, this is my spot!”
I pointed to a nearby stool and said, “There’s your spot, jackass; go sit over there,” but
Jamal wouldn’t move out of the way. Finally, I pushed him away, not very hard and without
intending to push him down or harm him. [Jamal/Scott] must have tripped because he fell on the
floor. I then turned toward [Jamal/Scott] and said something to the effect that [Jamal/Scott]
should go away and leave me alone. I can’t remember my exact words because I was upset at the
time, but I did not threaten [Jamal/Scott] or imply that I meant to hurt him then or later.
I finished my drink and though I wanted to have another, I agreed with Connie’s
suggestion that we leave and go to her house. Eager to spend some time alone with Connie, I
hurried through the bar toward the front door. I did not know that [Jamal/Scott] was still on the
premises and was not even thinking about the incident with [Jamal/Scott] at the time.
When I was about 15 feet from the door, I pulled out my black wallet to see if I had
enough money to buy a pizza to take to Connie’s house. Although I did have my pocket knife on
me, I did not pull it out and it was in a different pocket than my wallet. I was still looking in my
wallet when I got to within two steps of the door.
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The next thing I remember was waking up in a bed in the hospital.
Dated: _______________________
_____________________________
Scott Wilson
STATEMENT OF RICHARD CERVANTES (PROSECUTION WITNESS)
I, Richard Cervantes, state:
My name is Richard Cervantes. I’m a bartender at Melanie’s Bar in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. At about 9:45 p.m. on June 4, I was standing at the bar, serving, when I saw [Jamal
Howard/Scott Wilson] and Tanya Morgan walk from the other side of the bar to the water
fountain, where [Jamal/Scott] began washing his hand. [Jamal/Scott] got mad and said, “Just
leave me alone,” or, “Just let it alone.”
A few moments later, [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard] walked past me toward the front
door. Then, [Scott/Jamal] pulled something out of his back pocket. I was serving someone at the
time, so I did not clearly see what [Scott/Jamal] was holding. After [Scott/Jamal] walked past
me, I continued serving the other patrons of the bar. I looked up in time to see [Jamal/Scott] hit
[Scott/Jamal] across the face with a piece of wood that usually sits on the windowsill. The wood
is used to prop the window open on hot days. [Scott/Jamal] groaned and fell to the floor. He
wasn’t moving.
When [Scott/Jamal] was hit, Connie Cook was a few feet behind him. For a few seconds,
she just stood there; [Jamal/Scott} stood with the stick in his hands --- nobody moved. It all
happened so fast that at first it was as if they were in suspended animation. Then Connie ran to
[Scott’s/Jamal’s] side. [Jamal/Scott] dropped the piece of wood and ran out the door. I ran from
behind the bar after [Jamal/Scott].
[Jamal/Scott] ran alongside the building towards the rear, but seemed unsure of where he
should go. His hesitation allowed me to catch up with him. I grabbed him by the arm and said,
“Why did you do that? Why’d you hit him like that?” [Jamal/Scott] replied, “I had to man, I just
had to.” I remember this clearly. I took [Jamal/Scott] back to the bar where I called the police.
This is the first time there has been trouble since I’ve been bartending at Melanie’s Bar.
Dated: _______________________
_____________________________
Richard Cervantes
STATEMENT OF CONNIE COOK (PROSECUTION WITNESS)
I, Connie Cook, state:
My name is Connie Cook. I’m a student at the University of Minnesota, where I recently
met [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard].
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On June 4, [Scott/Jamal] came by my house in the evening, and the two of us went to
Melanie’s Bar in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This was our first date. When we arrived at the bar,
[Scott/Jamal] said, “Hey, let’s get a drink,” and we immediately sat down at two unoccupied
stools at the bar.
[Scott/Jamal] bought me a beer, and we began to drink together. Suddenly, [Jamal
Howard/Scott Wilson] stomped over, followed by Tanya Morgan, and began yelling at
[Scott/Jamal] to, “Beat it!” and, “Get away from my seat!” [Scott/Jamal] ignored him and
started drinking his drink again, but [Jamal/Scott] tried to shoulder him away from his stool
anyway. When [Jamal/Scott] shouldered [Scott/Jamal], [Scott/Jamal] spilled some of his drink
onto the bar. [Scott/Jamal] pushed [Jamal/Scott] back, and [Jamal/Scott] took a couple of steps
backwards, then seemed to trip over his own feet, falling on the floor.
[Scott/Jamal] said to [Jamal/Scott], “Now buzz off; I don’t want to see you around here
bothering me anymore.” [Jamal/Scott] and Tanya left the area, and we finished our drinks. I
suggested that we leave and asked [Scott/Jamal] to take me home.
[Scott/Jamal] agreed and walked quickly toward the front door. Suddenly, when
[Scott/Jamal] was six or seven feet from the door, I saw [Jamal/Scott] poised to strike with the
piece of wood. [Scott/Jamal] didn’t seem to notice and kept walking toward the door. When
[Scott/Jamal] was almost to the door, [Jamal/Scott] stepped towards him and then hit him with
the piece of wood.
It happened so fast that I did not have a chance to warn [Scott/Jamal]. [Scott/Jamal] fell
to the ground and was bleeding and moaning, and [Jamal/Scott] ran out the door. I tried to revive
[Scott/Jamal], but he remained unconscious. Shortly thereafter, I saw Richard Cervantes come
back into the bar holding [Jamal/Scott] by the arm.
Dated: _______________________
_____________________________
Connie Cook
STATEMENT OF [JAMAL HOWARD/SCOTT WILSON] (DEFENDANT)
I, [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson], state:
My name is [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson]. I’m a student at the University of Minnesota.
On June 4 at about 9:30 p.m., I was having a drink at Melanie’s Bar in Minneapolis, Minnesota. I
had waited for over an hour to grab two stools in the bar area. Tanya Morgan was with me. This
was our first date.
Tanya and I were both out of cash, so we went to the ATM to get some more money.
When we returned, [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard] and Connie Cook were sitting in our seats. I
told [Scott/Jamal] that I was sitting there and had left for a moment to get some money. I
suggested that [Scott/Jamal] sit at a table along the wall instead, but [Scott/Jamal] refused to let
me have our seats back and said, sarcastically, that I should go sit in a broken stool with beer
spilled on it.
When I attempted to sit in the stool again, [Scott/Jamal] shoved me down on the floor,
causing me to sprain my wrist and scrape my hand. [Scott/Jamal] then tried to come toward me
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to fight with me but was restrained by Tanya and Connie. [Scott/Jamal] scowled and said, “If I
see you again, I’ll mess you up!” Then he went back to drinking his beer.
I got up and went with Tanya to the water fountain near the front door. I was cleaning my
cut hand in the fountain when I saw [Scott/Jamal] coming at me fast. [Scott/Jamal] had what
looked like a knife in his hand and appeared to be ready to use it. Feeling helpless with my right
wrist sprained, and remembering that [Scott/Jamal] had promised to hurt me if he saw me again,
I grabbed the first thing I could find to defend myself --- a piece of wood on the windowsill next
to me. When [Scott/Jamal] was almost close enough to stab me or to jump on me, I, in
desperation, swung the wood and hit [Scott/Jamal]. I dropped the wood and, afraid that
[Scott/Jamal] still might come after me, ran out the door.
A few seconds later, I looked back and saw Richard Cervantes running behind me. I
stopped and Richard grabbed me. Richard asked me why I had hit [Scott/Jamal] and I replied, “I
just had to,” meaning that it was the only way I had to defend myself.
Dated: _______________________
_____________________________
Jamal Howard
STATEMENT OF TANYA MORGAN (DEFENSE WITNESS)
I, Tanya Morgan, state:
My name is Tanya Morgan. I’m a student at the University of Minnesota. On June 4,
[Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] asked me out. He picked me up at 9:00 p.m. and took me to
Melanie’s Bar in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
After a wait, [Jamal/Scott] and I sat at the bar and had a drink. After finishing our drinks,
[Jamal/Scott] said he would like to buy me another, but he was out of cash. We went to the
ATM to get some cash. When we got back, [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard] and Connie Cook had
taken our seats. [Jamal/Scott] told [Scott/Jamal] that he and I just went to get some cash, and
that [Scott/Jamal] should go sit something else.
[Scott/Jamal] got mad and pushed [Jamal/Scott] down. [Jamal/Scott] landed on his hand
and looked hurt. [Scott/Jamal] started to come after [Jamal/Scott] but I grabbed his arm to hold
him back. Connie Cook might have grabbed [Scott’s/Jamal’s] other arm, but I’m not sure.
[Scott/Jamal] said to [Jamal/Scott], “If I see you again, I’ll beat you up!”
I helped [Jamal/Scott] up, and the two of us walked over to the fountain to clean up his
hand. As we were washing [Jamal’s/Scott’s] scrape, I saw [Scott/Jamal] coming towards us
angrily. There was something in his hand.
[Jamal/Scott] picked up a piece of wood from the windowsill, and when [Scott/Jamal]
was about to jump him, [Jamal/Scott] hit him with it. [Scott/Jamal] fell on the floor, and
[Jamal/Scott] ran outside. Richard Cervantes chased after him.
I called an ambulance and when I returned, Richard had [Jamal/Scott] by the arm and
was leading him back into the bar.
Dated: _______________________
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_____________________________
Tanya Morgan
STATEMENT OF JACLYN BARDIE (DEFENSE WITNESS)
I, Jaclyn Bardie, state:
My name is Jaclyn Bardie. I’m a student at the University of Minnesota. I had dated
[Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] on several occasions before the bar incident. I thought he was
quiet; I would have gone out with him again, but he stopped calling.
On June 4 at about 8:30 p.m., I drove over to Melanie’s Bar with my friend, Linda
Robinson. I had a couple of drinks hoping to see my friends. After half an hour of sitting at the
bar, Linda and I moved to a table near the front door.
I was sitting about ten feet from the door, facing the door, when I saw [Jamal/Scott] and
Tanya Morgan by the water fountain. Tanya was holding the faucet, and [Jamal/Scott] had his
hand under the water.
After [Jamal/Scott] had stopped washing his hand, I noticed [Scott Wilson/Jamal
Howard] and Connie Cook walking fast and directly towards [Jamal/Scott]. I thought
[Scott/Jamal] looked like he was going to do something to [Jamal/Scott]. [Jamal/Scott] just
stood there, and when [Scott/Jamal] got close, [Jamal/Scott] picked up a piece of wood and hit
him. [Scott/Jamal] fell down, moaning. [Jamal/Scott] dropped the piece of wood and ran out the
door. Everything happened very fast. Richard Cervantes ran outside too and brought
[Jamal/Scott] back inside.
I remember what everybody was wearing: Tanya had on a skirt and a yellow shirt;
Connie had purple pants and a tube top; [Jamal/Scott] and [Scott/Jamal] were both wearing
jeans. [Jamal/Scott] had an orange t-shirt on. [Scott/Jamal] had his name printed on his shirt.
I tried talking to [Jamal/Scott] while we waited for the police, but he didn’t say much.
[Jamal’s/Scott’s] lawyer called and asked me to testify, and I agreed since [Jamal/Scott] is a
friend of mine.
Dated: _______________________
_____________________________
Jaclyn Bardie
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EXHIBIT A: DIAGRAM OF MELANIE’S BAR
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EXHIBIT B: PHOTOGRAPH OF PIECE OF WOOD USED BY [JAMAL
HOWARD/SCOTT WILSON]

Note: The dimensions of this exhibit are approximately 2” wide, 12” long, 1” thick
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EXHIBIT C: PHOTOGRAPH OF [SCOTT WILSON’S/JAMAL HOWARD’S] POCKET
KNIFE

Note: The blade of this pocket knife is approximately 3” long.
POST-TRIAL INSTRUCTIONS BY JUDGE HARRIS
Members of the jury, the instructions I gave you at the beginning of the trial remain in
effect. I now give you some additional instructions. You must continue to follow the instructions
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I gave you earlier as well as follow the instructions I give you now. The instructions I will now
give you will be available to you while you consider your verdict.
It is your duty to find from the evidence what the facts are. You will then apply the law,
as I give it to you, to those facts. You must follow my instructions on the law, even if you
thought the law was different or should be different. Do not allow sympathy or prejudice to
influence you. The law demands of you a just verdict, unaffected by anything except the
evidence, your common sense, and the law as I give it to you.
The indictment in this case charges the defendant with assault with a deadly weapon. The
defendant has pleaded not guilty to that charge. The indictment is simply the document that
formally charges the defendant with the crime and is not considered evidence.
At the beginning of the trial, I instructed you that you must presume the defendant to be
innocent. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to find the defendant not guilty and
can only be overcome if the prosecution proved during the trial, beyond a reasonable doubt, each
element of the crime charged. There is no burden upon the defendant to prove that he is innocent.
Instead, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution throughout the trial.
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Appendix B
Attorney Statements
Note: Elements that differ across Defendant Race conditions are noted in italicized brackets.
Elements that differ across Race Salience conditions are noted in bolded, underlined text.
OPENING STATEMENT FROM BRIAN THOMAS (PROSECUTION ATTORNEY)
Your honor, and ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am Brian Thomas, and I represent the State
of Minnesota as well as [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard], the victim in the case you will hear today.
Let me restate that, because it is important for you to remember: [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard] is
the victim of assault with a deadly weapon, committed by the defendant, Mr. [Jamal
Howard/Scott Wilson], and the evidence you will be presented with today will prove that beyond
a reasonable doubt.
These are the facts of the case as will be presented by our witnesses today. On June 4, the victim
and his date, Connie Cook, went to Melanie’s Bar to have a drink. Seeing two open stools at the
bar, [Scott/Jamal] and Connie sat down and ordered drinks. It was at this time, around 9:30 p.m.,
that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] and Tanya Morgan, the defendant’s girlfriend, initially approached
the victim; he and Tanya had previously been sitting in the stools and wanted them back. You
will hear testimony from several people about this initial altercation, which ended when Mr.
[Howard/Wilson] fell to the ground. Following this, Mr. [Howard/Wilson] and his date left the
area. After finishing their drinks, the victim and Ms. Cook decided to leave the bar. As they were
leaving, the victim pulled out his wallet to see if he had money to buy a pizza. It was then that
Mr. [Howard/Wilson] grabbed a slab of wood and smashed it across the victim’s head, knocking
him unconscious in the process. These facts, including that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] hit the victim,
are indisputable.
What is under dispute, ladies and gentlemen, is whether Mr. [Howard/Wilson] acted in selfdefense. I am confident that the evidence you will see today will prove that the victim did
nothing to provoke the assault Mr. [Howard/Wilson] inflicted upon him.
The defense will claim that during the initial incident about the barstools, the victim shoved Mr.
[Howard/Wilson] to the ground and threatened to harm him if he saw him again. You will hear
the defense use these claims as evidence that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] later acted in self-defense.
However, only Mr. [Howard/Wilson] and his girlfriend claim to have heard any threats; no other
witnesses will corroborate these statements. In addition, if Mr. [Howard/Wilson] attacked the
victim because he was shoved earlier, this is an act of retaliation, not of self-defense.
The defense will also use the presence of a knife on the victim’s person as evidence that Mr.
[Howard/Wilson] acted in self-defense. Mr. [Howard/Wilson] will testify that he saw the victim
pull out the knife and walk in the general direction where he was standing. However, the victim
claims that he pulled out a wallet, not a knife. More importantly, you will hear no other witness
testify that they saw a knife. When I say no witnesses, I mean none: not even the defense’s
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witnesses will claim to have seen a knife. Given this, is the simple presence of a knife on the
victim’s person, which is perfectly legal in the state of Minnesota, justification enough to knock
someone out cold in self-defense?
Contrary to what the defense will suggest, the evidence you will see today will indicate to you
that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] was looking for a fight, not trying to avoid one. Consider the
evidence. It was Mr. [Howard/Wilson] who started the initial altercation over the barstools. It
was Mr. [Howard/Wilson] who waited around the bar; in fact, the victim was trying to leave the
bar when the attack occurred. It was Mr. [Howard/Wilson] who struck the victim in the head
with a chunk of wood.
[Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] was a man expecting a fight on the night of June 4. As you will
see during this trial, his actions that night toward [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard] were aggressive,
not defensive. Do not let claims of threats or knives cloud your understanding of the facts. Do
not forget that [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard] is the victim here today.
OPENING STATEMENT FROM CHRISTOPHER BELL (DEFENSE ATTORNEY)
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen of the jury. My name is Christopher Bell, and I am the
attorney representing the defendant, Mr. [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson]. In the case before you
today, you will hear about a physical act committed by my client toward Mr. [Scott
Wilson/Jamal Howard]. The act itself is not what we are debating today. Mr. [Howard/Wilson]
and all the witnesses agree that he struck Mr. [Wilson/Howard] with a piece of wood on the
night of June 4.
The real issue at hand is this: Why did [Jamal/Scott] hit [Scott/Jamal]? Over the course of this
trial, the evidence will prove that [Jamal/Scott] was acting in self-defense following a series of
aggressive acts committed by [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard] immediately before the incident.
Quite frankly, ladies and gentlemen, if [Jamal/Scott] were not [Black/White] and
[Scott/Jamal] were not [White/Black], we would not be in this room today. The evidence will
indicate that as soon as [Scott/Jamal] saw [Jamal/Scott], he began a sequence of physical and
verbal abuse that ended only after my bloodied client left the area. These abuses also included a
direct threat from [Scott/Jamal]: “If I see you again, I’ll mess you up.” It is no wonder, then, that
my client reacted in defense when he noticed Scott approaching him with an object in his hand.
With all due respect to the prosecuting attorney, the evidence will show that his description of
my client is erroneous. The prosecution has tried to paint [Jamal/Scott] as a hot-headed college
kid looking for a bar fight. But what does the evidence actually say? Jaclyn Bardie will testify
that [Jamal/Scott] is generally quiet and shy, and [Jamal/Scott] himself will testify that he felt
afraid of [Scott/Jamal]. [Jamal/Scott] was on a first date with his girlfriend, Tanya Morgan, that
night. And after the initial incident over the barstools, [Jamal/Scott] walked away from the
situation. Does this sound like a man looking to start a fight that night?
The only reason [Jamal/Scott] is on trial today and not [Scott/Jamal] is because
[Jamal/Scott] is [Black/White] and [Scott/Jamal] is [White/Black]. If anything, ladies and
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gentlemen, the evidence will show that it was [Scott/Jamal] who was ready for conflict. After
all, it was [Scott/Jamal] who pushed [Jamal/Scott] down; this is a fact that no witness disputes.
It was also [Scott/Jamal], not [Jamal/Scott], who brought a deadly weapon with him to the bar –
a jagged knife with a three-inch blade.
The prosecuting attorney has dismissed Mr. [Wilson’s/Howard’s] knife as irrelevant to this case.
After all, [Jamal/Scott] wasn’t stabbed, and only [Jamal/Scott] could definitively say that he saw
a knife in [Scott’s/Jamal’s] hand. However, several witnesses, including [Scott/Jamal] himself,
will testify that [Scott/Jamal] reached into his pocket and was holding something.
Let me repeat: the issue that you, the jury, must decide is why [Jamal/Scott] struck
[Scott/Jamal]. [Jamal/Scott] does not deny that he hit [Scott/Jamal] on the night of June 4.
Whether Mr. [Wilson/Howard] actually intended to harm my client is irrelevant when
considering if [Jamal/Scott] acted in self-defense. Self-defense simply means that the person
believed they needed to use force to protect themselves in the situation. In light of all the
evidence you will see in this case – including [Scott’s/Jamal’s] threats, my client’s timid nature,
and the presence of the knife – it is clear that [Jamal/Scott] had reason to believe that force was
necessary. Thank you.
CLOSING ARGUMENT FROM CHRISTOPHER BELL (DEFENSE ATTORNEY)
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this case comes down to two issues: whether my client acted in
self-defense and reasonable doubt of my client’s guilt. There are five elements of the charge of
assault with a deadly weapon, and you must be convinced that all five are present in order to
render a guilty verdict today. The most important of these five elements is whether or not [Jamal
Howard/Scott Wilson] acted in self-defense.
The court has already defined self-defense, but allow me to reiterate. Legally, an individual has
acted in self-defense if they reasonably believed themselves to be in physical danger from
another and used force to prevent that violence from occurring. In other words, the court says
that you don’t have to wait for someone to harm you before you try to stop them as long as you
reasonably believed yourself to be in imminent danger. This issue of “reasonable belief” is
important, and it’s a question you must answer for yourself. Did [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson]
have a legitimate reason to believe he was in harm’s way on the night of June 4?
It would be easy to underestimate the fear my client felt at Melanie’s Bar that night. It would be
easy to take Mr. [Wilson’s/Howard’s] testimony at face value, to downplay the threat he issued
to my client, to ignore that he shoved my client to the ground, to ignore the knife he brought with
him to the bar. It might be easy, but I ask you not to take the easy route today. Remember that
[Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] was actually there: he was actually threatened; he was actually
shoved to the ground; he actually thought he saw a knife in Mr. [Wilson’s/Howard’s] hand, a
knife that actually happened to be there that night. Given all of this, my client’s actions were
clearly reasonable and justifiable. These facts do not change simply because [Jamal/Scott] is
[Black/White] and [Scott/Jamal] is [White/Black].
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If you conclude with certainty that [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] acted in self-defense, then you
must acquit him of the charges today. However, even if you are not certain that he acted in selfdefense, the law requires that you are certain beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with
malicious intent. If you have any doubts that my client acted with malice, then you must also
acquit him today. In this matter, the evidence speaks for itself. The eyewitnesses who testified
that Mr. [Wilson/Howard] pushed and threatened my client; the presence of the knife; even the
bartender who saw something being pulled out of Mr. [Wilson’s/Howard’s] pocket – these are
the seeds of reasonable doubt.
The injuries to Mr. [Wilson/Howard] on the night of June 4 are regrettable and undeniable.
However, these injuries are not sufficient to convict [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson]. The law
provides self-defense as a justification because we should be allowed to protect ourselves from
others’ harmful actions. It is human nature to protect yourself and those you love; indeed, I
would expect all of us in this room to act the same if we felt physically threatened.
The definition of self-defense is the same for us all, regardless of the color of our skin.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if you choose to convict my client, you are asking him to go
against human nature. You are concluding that we are not allowed to protect ourselves from
harm. Make the right choice today. Thank you.
CLOSING ARGUMENT FROM BRIAN THOMAS (PROSECUTION ATTORNEY)
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defense would have you forget that [Scott Wilson/Jamal
Howard] is the victim in this case. To hear my colleague, Mr. Bell, tell it, [Jamal Howard/Scott
Wilson] was simply acting as anyone in his situation would have. To hear the defense tell it, it is
[Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] who is the true victim here, not [Scott Wilson/Jamal Howard]. I
implore you: do not fall for their ruse.
As the defense has pointed out, there are five components that make up a conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon. However, the defense glossed over the fact that four of these five
components are not up for debate at all because they are already proven without dispute. It is
undeniable that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] attacked the victim with a deadly weapon; you have seen
the weapon as an exhibit today. It is undeniable that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] attacked the victim
willingly – no one forced him to grab a piece of wood and hit the victim. Mr. [Howard/Wilson]
also knew that his actions would cause harm and he had the ability to apply this harm. No one –
not the defense attorney, not even the defendant himself – can argue that Mr.
[Howard’s/Wilson’s] actions meet these first four criteria.
It is the fifth component – self-defense – that you must draw a conclusion about today. The
defense has already discussed this topic, but let me paint you a different and, I would argue,
more accurate picture of the facts from the night of June 4. The defense has highlighted the
initial altercation between the victim and Mr. [Howard/Wilson] as evidence of Mr.
[Wilson’s/Howard’s] aggression. However, they fail to point out that the entire incident started
as an argument over barstools instigated by Mr. [Howard/Wilson]. The defense has accused the
victim of pushing Mr. [Howard/Wilson] down and threatening him, but the only witnesses who
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testified to either of these allegations were Mr. [Howard/Wilson] and his girlfriend – no one else.
The defense has alluded several times to the knife that the victim was carrying, even suggesting
that the victim pulled the knife out, but they neglect to mention that nobody but the defendant
saw the victim with a knife.
People should have the freedom to defend themselves from imminent danger – I do not intend to
deny this right. What I am contending is that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] was not defending himself.
Ask yourself: If Mr. [Howard/Wilson] was not looking for a fight that night, why would he have
confronted the victim and started an argument over barstools? If Mr. [Howard/Wilson] was not
looking for a fight, then why did he stay at the bar at all after the initial altercation? Why didn’t
he leave? And most importantly, if Mr. [Howard/Wilson] was not looking for a fight, why did he
strike the victim in the head with a piece of wood so hard that Mr. [Wilson/Howard] lost
consciousness?
To reach a guilty verdict today, you the jury must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr.
[Howard/Wilson] did not act in self-defense on the night of June 4. Remember, however, that
beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean you are 100% certain. Instead, it means that a
reasonable person would agree with you that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] acted with aggression, not
self-defense. Consider the facts I mentioned before. Consider all of the evidence you have seen
in this case today. A reasonable person would conclude that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] did not knock
the victim unconscious as an act of self-defense. A reasonable person would agree that Mr.
[Howard/Wilson] acted unreasonably. A reasonable person would hold Mr. [Howard/Wilson]
accountable for the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. A reasonable person would find Mr.
[Howard/Wilson] guilty. Thank you.
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Appendix C
Juror Questionnaire
Instructions: Based on the evidence presented, and the judicial instructions you were given,
please answer the following questions regarding your opinions regarding the verdict and other
related items below. For each question, please indicate your answer by circling the item
corresponding to your desired response and/or writing your answer in the blank space provided.

________ 1. Using the scale below, how guilty do you believe the defendant to be?
Not at all
Guilty
1

2

3

4

5

6

Completely
Guilty
7

________ 2. Please enter your verdict in the present case for the charge of assault with a deadly
weapon for the defendant.
a. Not Guilty

b. Guilty

3. The United States Sentencing Commission (2015) has recommended guidelines for sentencing
individuals convicted of assault and aggravated assault, either of which can be used to sentence
someone convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. These guidelines are as follows:
Assault:
If the offense is deemed to be simple assault, a sentence of 0-6 years is
appropriate
If the victim sustained bodily injury, a sentence of 4-10 years is appropriate
Aggravated Assault:
The base sentence for aggravated assault should be between 15 and 21 years.
If the assault involved more than minimal planning, add 6 years to the base
sentence.
If the offense involved strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or
suffocate a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner, add 9-10 years to the
sentence.
If the assault was motivated by a payment or offer of money, add 6 years to the
sentence.
If the offense involved violation of a court protection order, add 6 years to the
sentence.
Choose only one of the following (if applicable):
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If a firearm was discharged, add 16-18 years to the sentence.
If a dangerous weapon was otherwise used, add 11-15 years to the sentence.
If a dangerous weapon was threatened, add 9-10 years to the sentence.
Choose only one of the following (if applicable):
If the victim sustained minor bodily injury, add 11-15 years to the sentence.
If the victim sustained serious bodily injury, add 16-18 years to the sentence.
If the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, add 25-30
years to the sentence.
Using the guidelines outlined above, please provide a recommended sentence in years for the
defendant in this case:
_______________ years
________ 4. Using the scale below, how violent do you believe the defendant to be?
Not at all
Violent
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Very
Violent
9

________ 5. Using the scale below, how aggressive do you believe the defendant to be?
Not at all
Aggressive
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Very
Aggressive
9

________ 6. Using the scale below, how strong did you find the case for the defense?
Very
Weak
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
Strong
7

________ 7. Using the scale below, how strong did you find the case for the prosecution?
Very
Weak
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
Strong
7

________ 8. Using the scale below, to what extent do you believe that this case was racially
motivated?
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5
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6

Completely
7

Appendix D
Jury Characteristics Questionnaire

1. What timeslot is this document for? ____________________ (Date and Time)

2. How many individuals were in the jury for this timeslot? _________________

3. Describe the gender breakdown of the jury (number of men/women). ___________________

4. How long did the jury deliberate? ___________________

5. If a unanimous verdict was reached, what was it?

Guilty

Not Guilty/Acquittal

No Verdict/Hung

6. What is the participant number of the juror who served as foreperson? ___________________

116

Appendix E
Modern Racism Scale
Indicate the degree to which you agree with these statements by typing the correct number from
the following scale in front of each item.
1 = "Strongly Disagree"
2 = "Disagree"
3 = "Neither Agree Nor Disagree"
4 = "Agree"
5 = "Strongly Agree"

____ 1. Discrimination against blacks is no longer a problem in the United States.
____ 2. It is easy to understand the anger of black people in America.
____ 3. Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
____ 4. Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.
____ 5. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.
____ 6. Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more respect to
blacks then they deserve.
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Appendix F
Social Dominance Orientation Scale
Instructions:
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement/disagreement by selecting the
appropriate number from 1 to 7. Remember that your first responses are usually the most
accurate.
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than others.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

2. No one group should dominate society.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

3. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

4. It’s okay if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5
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7. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

8. It would be good if all groups could be equal.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

9. We should strive to make incomes more equal.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

10. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

11. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

12. In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

13. We would have fewer problems if we treated different groups more equally.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

14. Group equality should be our ideal.
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1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

15. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the
bottom.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

6

7
Strongly
Agree

16. We should increase social equality.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5
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Appendix G
Post-Trial Questionnaire
Note: Differences across Experiment in the items are noted with italicized text.
Please provide the following information. This information is important so that we may compare
our sample to individuals selected for juries throughout the state. All information collected will
be kept anonymous and confidential.
1. Age: _________

2. Sex (circle one):

Male

Female

3. Are you a U.S. Citizen? (circle one):

Yes

No

4. How strong are your religious beliefs?
Not at all
Strong
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
Strong
7

6

Very
Liberal
7

5. What is your political orientation?
Very
Conservative
1
2

3

Moderate
4

5

6. Have you ever served on a jury? (circle one): Yes
If yes, what type of trial was it?

Criminal

No
Civil

What was the case about? ______________________________________
7. Have you ever been the victim of a crime?
Yes

No

8. Have you ever witnessed a crime?
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Yes
No
9. What was the defendant’s name in this case?
_____________________________
10. What was the race of the victim in this case?
_____________________________
11. Did the [attorney statements/news articles] you read mention anything about the
defendant’s race being relevant to the court case? If so, what did they say?

10. Sometimes in psychology experiments people think there is more going on than what
they are told. Did you have any thoughts along those lines during today’s session?
YES
If YES, please explain the thoughts you had:
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NO

Appendix H
Pre-Deliberation Jury Instructions (Experiment 1 Only)
In conducting your deliberations and returning your verdict, there are certain rules you
must follow. I will list those rules for you now.
First, once I leave the room, you must select one of your members as your foreperson.
That person will preside over your discussions and speak for you if you have questions during
your deliberations.
Second, it is your duty, as jurors, to discuss this case with one another in the jury room.
You should try to reach agreement if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. I
encourage you to reach a consensus decision – whether guilty or not guilty – but you are not
required to.
Each of you must make your own conscientious decision, but only after you have
considered all the evidence, discussed it fully with your fellow jurors, and listened to the views
of your fellow jurors.
Do not be afraid to change your opinions if the discussion persuades you that you should.
But do not come to a decision simply because other jurors think it is right, or simply to reach a
verdict.
Third, remember that considerations of guilt and punishment are separate from one
another. When determining the defendant’s guilt, you should not consider punishment in any
way in deciding whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Fourth, if you need to communicate with me during your deliberations, you may send a
note to me through the foreperson. The foreperson should leave the room and come to me
outside with the note. I will respond as soon as possible either in writing or orally to the
foreperson. Remember that you should not tell anyone – including me – how your votes stand
numerically.
Fifth, your verdict must be based solely on the evidence and on the law which I have
given to you in my instructions. Again, I encourage you to reach a consensus, whether guilty or
not guilty, but a unanimous decision is not required. Nothing I have said or done is intended to
suggest what your verdict should be – that is entirely for you to decide.
You will have 20 minutes to deliberate and reach a decision. If a unanimous decision is
reached, the foreperson should write the verdict on this sheet and give it to me. If, after 20
minutes, you have not yet reached a unanimous decision, the jury will be considered hung and
we will move to the next phase of the study.
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Appendix I
Pretrial Publicity Materials
Note: Elements that differ across Defendant Race conditions are noted in italicized brackets.
Elements that differ across Race Salience conditions are noted in bolded, underlined text.
UNIVERSITY STUDENT ARRESTED FOLLOWING INTERRACIAL ASSAULT AT
LOCAL BAR
MINNEAPOLIS – A University of Minnesota student was arrested late last night after an
altercation at Melanie’s Bar that left another student in the hospital.
According to a Minneapolis Police Department report on the incident, several witnesses saw
[Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson], [an African-American male/a White male], hit [Scott
Wilson/Jamal Howard], [a White male/an African-American male], in the head with a blunt
object before running out of the bar. The incident knocked Howard unconscious, at which point a
9-1-1 call was placed.
After the incident, Wilson initially tried to leave the bar but was chased down by Richard
Cervantes, a bartender at Melanie’s Bar that night. “It looked like he was trying to run away,”
Cervantes told reporters, “but when I caught up to him, he was just standing there. He looked
confused.”
Witnesses also told police that Wilson and Howard had a brief altercation at the bar earlier in the
night in which Howard pushed Wilson to the ground. The cause of this earlier incident is not
immediately clear.
Wilson has not been formally charged with a crime at this time, but Ray Hansen, chief of police
at Minneapolis PD, did not rule out the possibility of future charges. “Our investigation is
currently ongoing. We will continue to collect information, and the results of the investigation
will be shared with the proper authorities.”
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[JAMAL HOWARD/SCOTT WILSON] TO STAND TRIAL FOR ASSAULT CHARGES,
JUDGE RULES
Associated Press – [Jamal Howard/Scott Wilson] will be formally arraigned on charges of
assault with a deadly weapon for an incident at a bar last June, according to Jean Reynolds of the
Star Tribune in Minneapolis. The arraignment is scheduled for next week.
[Howard/Wilson], a student at the University of Minnesota, faces one count of assault with a
deadly weapon, which carries a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. The incident occurred
at Melanie’s Bar in Minneapolis last June, where [Howard/Wilson] and [Scott Wilson/Jamal
Howard], another University of Minnesota student, were involved in an altercation that allegedly
led [Howard/Wilson] to hit [Wilson/Howard] with a block of wood, rendering him unconscious.
As expected, [Howard’s/Wilson’s] defense attorney, Christopher Bell, plans to argue that
[Howard/Wilson] acted in self-defense. Bell chided the court’s decision to move forward with a
trial, citing the lack of evidence that [Howard/Wilson] acted maliciously. “If my client was
[White/Black] and the victim was [Black/White], rather than the other way around, we
wouldn’t even be having this discussion. The fact that my client must stand trial for defending
himself in the face of Mr. [Wilson’s/Howard’s] threats and violent actions displays a clear
failure of our justice system,” Bell stated. “The evidence presented thus far against Mr.
[Howard/Wilson] is insubstantial at best. This case should already be over.”
But Brian Thomas, the prosecuting attorney representing the State of Minnesota, disagrees.
Thomas asserts that “[Howard/Wilson] acted with the intention to harm” [Wilson/Howard], not
to defend himself. “The evidence in this case clearly shows that Mr. [Howard/Wilson] was the
instigator on the night of June 4, and this upcoming trial gives us a chance to prove that.”
Samuel Harris, the judge presiding over the case, declined to comment for this story.
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